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Abstract: Secured long-distance communication has always been an important
topic for people handling sensitive information. Now with the arrival of “intelli-
gent“ mobile phones eavesdropping and information gathering is as easy as never.
Luckily smartphones present not only problems in terms of security but also an
opportunity to protect ones privacy. This thesis attempts to construct a generic
software architecture of a communicator which could be capable of transferring
voice, video and other various forms of binary data in a secure way. It will anal-
yse and use different communication channels to reach a maximum level of data
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1. Introduction
From the dawn of humankind’s history the need to protect gathered informa-
tion or knowledge existed as it would offer an advantage over a sometimes fierce
competition. This “informational advantage“ as we would call it today can and
was a deciding factor in the survival of individuals, tribes or even whole nations
or armies. Take for example a caveman, 10.000 BC, that had the knowledge of
where the sparse fresh water and food sources are located, the Roman empires
that had technology beyond anything that the competing northern tribes could
possibly invent at that time or a company developing a breakthrough piece of
software or hardware. All of them had the edge in battles over their rivals for a
long time, or to be exact, up the point where their rivals could obtain and use
the same information.
As sharing information is in many situations at least as important as storing
it the need to protect it would also expand to the exchange channels through
which the information was exchanged. Julius Caesar was also aware of that and
invented one of the first substitution ciphers that allowed him to command his
generals and soldiers on the front lines in secrecy even if his couriers carrying the
messages got kidnapped. Of course he was not the ultimately first one in history
to pay attention to this matter, various others such as Spartans or Indians have
used ciphers before him.
This is where cryptography comes into play. Cryptography – from the Greek
word “kryptos“ which means hidden, secret - is the study of techniques for secure
communication in the presence of malicious third parties. It allows us to trans-
mute data – the “plaintext“ – in way to a so called “ciphertext“ that only people
who possess the corresponding key can decrypt it back and read it. Therefore it
enables individuals to keep their informational advantage by minimizing the risk
of their information being revealed to eavesdroppers while communicating.
Nowadays, in the digital age so to speak, there is a consensus that sensitive
information in form of digital data and its exchange should be cryptographically
protected from theft, forgery and abuse. Sensitive data in this context can mean
anything from high-grade military technology blueprints, a company’s payroll list
up to a crooked broker’s Swiss account/credit card number or even baby photos
if someone considers them private and worth protecting. The stress in previous
sentence lies on the word “should“ as there are not always the means or even
the willpower present to accomplish just that. This applies even more to smart-
or mobile phones as the most private and corporate users do have one, but their
security lies mostly in the hands of the network operators. Users on the other
hand simply rely on the chance of “going under“ in the vast mass of other users
and therefore presenting a small target to e. g. thieves or corporate spies. They
are also hiding behind the logic that information about them is too unimportant
or not worth to others to facilitate a greater effort to obtain it. Whether this
logic is false or not is more of a philosophical and psychological question and is
outside the scope of this text. However fact is that despite a lot of cryptograph-
ically highly sophisticated security software, ciphers and protocols designed to
keep the data exchange safe do exist, it is not always used and not always is it
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easy to use. Also with the quick success and acceptance of smartphones as well
as online social networks many people are willing and getting used to share a lot
of information about them in a blink of the eye. But privacy concerns do arise
from time to time, usually only after it is already too late and someone’s credit
card has been abused or a trading secret was compromised and private users,
companies or even politicians are becoming more and more aware of the continu-
ously easier methods of wire-tapping a GSM call or reading their SMS messages1.
Smartphones unwillingly contribute in a way to these threats as they present a
potentially dangerous combination of having or transmitting the user’s private
data, their application distribution system (“App stores“ and the like) and their
mobile internet connectivity which makes them more traceable and vulnerable to
attacks. Things may turn even worse as the current trend is to shift payment
services to the smartphones as well which would present them as an even more
valuable target2.
However there are also some positives. Smartphones with their easily pro-
grammable platforms do provide an opportunity for 3rd-party applications to
enhance not only the user experience, but also their security. This opportunity
and the trending topic of mobile security provided the main motivation for this
thesis. It tries to design and implement a secure but extensible communication
software architecture on top of a current smartphone platform. A reasonably
easy to use prototype application of this architecture is part of this thesis with
focus set on the widespread Google Android platform and on secure voice calls
as they are still by far the mostly used communication channel today. Details on
the goals of the thesis will be elaborated in the following chapter.
1.1 Goals of the thesis
Based on the original specification of this thesis there were three main goals
predefined. Each of them has a number of sub-goals which have been summarized
for clarity in the following checklist:
1) Preparing an analysis and design for a secure communicator a software
architecture. This includes:
• Examining and choosing available I/O channels and mechanisms for data
and cryptographic keys exchange. The communicator should be capable to
use these channels individually or as a group.
• A detailed description of the architecture itself which has to be extendible,
capable of safely storing and transmitting data and potentially portable
to other platforms than Google Android (the application’s prototype plat-
form). It should not rely on a central authority that would support identity
verification or key exchange.
1See e.g. [1]
2The main keyword here is NFC, or Near-field communication technology, that is built into
newer smartphones and aims to replace credit cards.
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• Pointing out known limitations of the prototype’s underlying hardware and
software platform that constrict its implementation.
• Security analysis of the proposed design with elaboration of possible attack
vectors and threats.
2) Developing a prototype implementation within given constraints:
• The application is to be developed for the Google Android platform follow-
ing the proposed architecture.
• It has to have proper code documentation and a ready to deploy installation
package.
• Secured VoIP3 calls and methods for exchanging cryptographic keys must
be implemented.
3) Evaluating the programmed application prototype:
• Verify that the original requirements set in the analytical part were met.
• In case a requirement was not met, explain why and whether it could be
accomplished under different circumstances.
• Give suggestions for possible future extensions and optimizations of the
application or architecture respectively.
• Comparison of the prototype against related applications.
1.2 Text organization
The thesis text is divided into four main chapters, the first being this intro-
ductory text. The remaining chapters mimic the outline set in the thesis goals.
Chapter 2 covers the proposed software architecture solution and it’s analysis
in terms of the high-level design choices made as well as the possible caveats and
security threats for VoIP calls on mobile platforms and how the final application
should cope with them.
The third chapter focuses on selected implementation details of the prototype
application and some of the low-level choices made at development time.
The fourth and final text chapter evaluates the final implementation against
the design requirements specified in the analysis. A conclusion is made about
where the limitations of the suggested design lie within the current hardware and
software platforms. This is backed up by the summarized knowledge gained in the
development process and performance benchmarks. Also possible future exten-
sions are elaborated here along with a comparison to existing software solutions.
Appendixes such as the used literature, listings of illustrations and abbrevia-
tions and a short user guide for the application along with other attachments are
to be found at the end after the fourth chapter (in this order).
3Voice over IP: A commonly used acronym for voice calls over the Internet’s IP network.
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1.2.1 Conventions
Some of the text passages may be highlighted depending on their importance
or special meaning, e. g. chapter and subchapter titles are bold and numbered.
Code classes, packages, function calls and variable names referenced directly in
the text are formatted width a fixed width font, e.g. CallActivity or getData().
File or folder names mentioned in text have a cursive typeface, e.g. CallActiv-
ity.java. Fragments of programming code or other file contents are pre-formatted
and placed in a separate listing such as Listing 1.1.
Smaller figures are placed directly in the text flow where it is convenient,
larger pictures or diagrams are placed at the end of the corresponding chapter
or subchapter. All tables, code fragments and figures are indexed in the List of
Illustrations on page 70.
1 // Main method comment




Listing 1.1: Sample code fragment
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2. Analysis
This chapter discusses the analytical part of the thesis goals (section 1.1, 1st
list item) which starts in section 2.1 with identifying the main architectural and
implementation problems for designing such secure communicator architecture.
The proposed architecture is sketched and analysed in section 2.2 whereas the
following sections 2.3 to 2.7 give a deeper insight into each identified major issue
with the selected and alternative solutions respectively.
Related work is examined at the end in section 2.8.
2.1 Main issues
Building a mobile VoIP application, which in the end the secure communicator
is going to be in greater part, is for various reasons a quite difficult task in
itself. Requiring certain properties based on the thesis goals such as security and
extensibility adds further complexity. In this subchapter the main issues and
obstructions that had to be overcome are reflected. Each of them is marked in
bold typeface in the following text.
Beginning with the portability requirement the final architecture has to take
into account it may be run or ported to various platforms with varying hardware
and software environment parameters. This means not only different underlying
platform APIs but also different means of presentation. For example, mobile
platforms come with a relatively small screen size and have a set of own stan-
dards for the user interface compared to classical desktop software. Besides this
the architecture needs to be extensible in the sense that it has to be able to
easily incorporate (or even remove) components or features without impacting
the existing ones if possible. Performance, if possible, should be regarded as
a criterion due to limited computational capacities of current mobile hardware.
Section 2.2 covers these issues in detail.
Compatibility stands not only for that various instances of the same ar-
chitecture should be able to communicate with each other independent on the
endpoints’ platforms but also between other, already existing solutions. Section
2.6 elaborates this topic.
Security on the other hand has to be established on all interfaces of the appli-
cation including safe data storage and network transfer.
Transferring data securely involves multiple steps starting with the initial
distribution of cryptographic keys and identity authentication continuing with the
negotiation of session encryption keys and other security related parameters. In
addition typical problems for all VoIP related applications have to be solved like
controlling media sessions, NAT1 traversal and the media transmission
itself. See section 2.4.
1Network Address Translation – A technique used in network routers to modify IP address
information in packet headers.
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As an application needs also to store data a secure way of doing this had
to be established in chapter section 2.3.
Safely storing and transmitting data is only one part of the overall security
scheme. Without verifying the authenticity and integrity of the received and saved
data encryption would be next of useless. A complex overview on the security of
the architecture is handled by a thorough security analysis in section 2.5.
Last but not least the final prototype implementation must be developed with
respect to non-negotiable limitations of the selected platform. These constraints
will be examined in section 2.7 in order to expose possible discrepancies between
the intended design and the resulting solution.
Having the main issues identified and categorized the following sections analyse
each of them in detail.
2.2 Proposed architecture overview
In this chapter the secure communicator architecture from a high-level per-
spective is discussed so that it covers the requirements on portability and exten-
sibility. Security and lower-level problems are discussed in subsequent sections.
As already pointed out the issues for designing a portable architecture for this
type of application are twofold, once related to displaying data on various display
configurations and on the other hand related to accessing the underlying plat-
form’s API. This gave reason to use a 3-tier architecture with loose ties between
the graphical user interface (GUI) and the core logic unit that is situated on top
of a platform abstraction layer. The core logic is based on a universal events
system which is easily extendable with additional components. The question of
why this is advantageous and what cons this set-up may have will be answered
in the process of explaining it in detail.
The proposed architecture thus consists of four top-level components ordered
in three tiers (depicted in Figure 2.1):
1. A presentational layer responsible for drawing the GUI and handling
interactions with the user and the application logic.
2. A business logic layer containing the core logic of the application. It has
five sub-components. A platform abstraction layer serves as the connector
between the components and the underlying platform.
3. 3rd-party libraries shared by both of the previous layers as they may
address cross-cutting concerns and it would make no sense to include them
twice.
4. The platform itself on which the application will eventually be deployed.
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Figure 2.1: High level architecture overview
2.2.1 Events and controllers
The architecture specifically lays no constraints on the final form nor the
inner workings of the GUI as it may differ from platform to platform. However
the connection between the GUI and the logic layer is of great importance as it is
their single common point. Hence the connection needs to be well specified. This
is achieved through an event based system. Events in this context mean invoking
a specified action without calling a particular class method or function directly.
The class that handles the event eventually may send an event in response to
signal a result of the invoked action or to trigger another action in order. All
event types and their corresponding actions and responses are defined precisely
in Table A.1 (p.77) in the attachments section.
The EventHandler component aside from receiving the mentioned events is
responsible for keeping a registry of listeners to them. A listener is basically
every class that:
A. Implements the ICryptDroidEvents interface which contains a single method
handleIncomingEvent(Event e).
B. Registers its bindings – a set of event types they want to listen to – in the
handler by calling one of the subscription methods.
Listeners are typed as static or runtime. Static means they are known at com-
pile time and so are their bindings which must be registered at application start-
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up automatically by calling subscribeStaticListener(EventType e, ICrypt-
DroidEvents callback). Runtime listeners may be for example dynamically
created GUI windows or dialogs with a relatively short life span where it is un-
desirable that they should respond to events if they are hidden or not existent.
Therefore they register themselves in the event handler at creation time and
should deregister themselves at destruction time (e.g. closing a dialog). For
this the methods subscribeRuntimeListener(...) and unsubscribeRuntime-
Listener(...) should be used respectively (parameters omitted as they are
equal to the static subscription method).
A further categorization of static listeners is that they may be specified to be
singletons or prototypes. Singletons must follow the singleton pattern ([2]) and
possess a static method getInstance(), prototypes on the other hand a valid
parameterless constructor. The difference is that singleton listeners are a single
instance of the class that must be returned by the getInstance() method. The
method is called by the EventHandler every time an event is to be processed by
that listener. Similarly every time an event bound to a prototype listener is fired
a new instance of that listener is to be created.
Runtime listeners do not share this distinction as an instance always already
exists – the one that registered itself.
Listeners in the logic layer than contain the core logic were labelled as con-
trollers.
Firing an event means to call one of the EventHandler‘s sendEvent() methods
with the desired event type or the event object directly. Event objects should be
created only in the EventFactory class by calling EventFactory.createEvent-
(EventType) and they are allowed to carry a generic object as the payload (pa-
rameter). The receiver of the event has to downcast the parameter by himself.
UML diagrams with complete interfaces for the EvenHandler and EventFactory
are shown in Figure 2.2.
After the event is received by the event handler it is processed and queued.
The event handler should process the events asynchronously meaning that a con-
tinuously running thread should take events from a queue and sent them to all
registered listeners by calling their handleIncomingEvent(Event e) method. In
respect to their type the listeners may have to be created first. It is advisable
to use a thread pool to invoke the callback method in as a separate task as it a)
limits the number of concurrent running callbacks and b) is better for exception
handling should the callback method fail in some way. Listing 2.1 demonstrates
this process in pseudo-code. This also means the event originator implementa-
tion should make no assumptions about the time, duration or the order of the
processing of the fired event.
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1 for each registeredListener to given event
2 begin
3 if registeredListener.type = "runtime"
4 then
5 listener = registeredListener.get()
6 else if listener.scope = "prototype"
7 listener = new registeredListener.class
8 else
9 listener = registeredListener.getInstance ()
10 end if
11 ThreadPool.submitTask(listener , event)
12 end
Listing 2.1: Event processing pseudo-code
Figure 2.2: UML Diagram of EventHandler and EventFactory
As long as all the specified event actions and responses to them (see Table A.1
on page 77) are stable and predictable the implementation may add custom con-
trollers/listeners or even event types without impacting the core logic. By all
means this is definitely an advantage over tightly coupled implementations as it
allows easy extensions and modifications of the final implementation. However by
adding an extension it must not happen that an event is not responded to when
it should be or it is responded twice to (except when this would be the expected
behaviour for some reason).
Such a setup has also other advantages, one being that using events does not
tie the GUI implementation to a specific class implementation or interface. In
a sense events therefore replace the classical programming interface. Also firing
a single event may trigger multiple actions, but the GUI does not need to keep
track of this which in turn reduces the logic complexity in the presentational
layer. Another benefit is that all events are handled by as single EventHandler
component which can perform operations on the events such as to queue and
prioritize them before their further distribution to event callbacks.
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The biggest disadvantage is synchronization between two related events. For
example imagine the user starting a call and after a while cancelling it while the
phone is still ringing on his side while in the meantime the remote party has
already accepted the call. Correctly the cancellation should be ignored. Senders
and receivers of events therefore have to be able to take care of such situations
even if the event handler makes no guarantees on the order of processing events.
A partial solution to this is that event types can be prioritized. However prioriti-
zation does not guarantee that the higher priority event processing gets finished
first and can send a proper response before the second event arrives in another
controller. In case of similar situations the listeners may have to use a synchro-
nization lock in the events callback method to prevent the object state being in
disarray.
Synchronization issues do also arise in complicated object state flows, where
multiple events must or can be chained one after the other. This requires multiple
event responses and for the controllers to wait for them before firing another event.
This may lead to an undesirable high amount of event types (one for each status
change). A solution to that is to use the same event type with different arguments
(such as a sequence number, a tag or a flag).
One of the alternatives to the event system would be to move the (connecting)
parts of the application’s core logic to the GUI layer and keep the controllers
only as simple black-box approach objects with a single strictly defined function-
ality. Apart from the obvious shift of responsibility towards the presentational
layer this approach would require a set of a set of callback interfaces in order to
respond to naturally occurring events in the logic of the application (such as an
incoming call). The GUI then would have to either register these callbacks in the
corresponding controllers and services or at a central repository that keeps track
of all callbacks. Since tracking down all needed callbacks and responsible objects
would be error-prone and tedious a central repository would seem as the better
choice here. But this is basically how the event handler works now, with the
added benefit that the GUI does not need to care from which controller the event
originates or where to subscribe to listen for a specific event as all subscriptions
are made in the event handler. In addition the events system removes the burden
of maintaining complex logic from the GUI and keeps the presentational layer
simple. Ergo it was decided to use the events system as it offers more flexibility,
features and structure for less effort.
2.2.2 HAL
Exceptions to the single point of contact rule between the GUI and the busi-
ness logic layer are classes with public static methods that may be called from
everywhere. This applies to utility classes with helper functions but mainly to the
database2 and the platform abstraction layer, or “HAL“. The technically correct




HAL is responsible for abstracting the underlying platform layer away from
the core logic and GUI. It thus defines interfaces to system services, hardware
and any other functionality that would require a direct platform API call or
is somehow tied to the underlying OS. The GUI can probably access the API
straightforwardly because it has direct access to the platform, but this should be
avoided whenever possible as it makes code less reusable and portable. Directing
all possible calls through HAL is also preferable as it allows it to manage or pool
resources more effectively.
Platform specific implementations of HAL in the current version have to sup-
port at least abstractions for system notifications, audio playback and recording,
accessing the file system, system information (such as the device’s serial num-
ber) and preferences. Additional abstractions are allowed as deemed necessary
to implement the core logic of the application.
An alternative solution to the HAL pattern would be similar to the alternative
approach of the events system where all parts of the application’s core logic
requiring a system API call would be moved to the presentational layer. Because
of the previously mentioned portability and efficiency arguments and in this case
also the added complexity of the GUI implementation the loose-coupling HAL
standard pattern was favoured.
2.2.3 Configuration
Each application should be configurable to some extent without rewriting por-
tions of code. Our proposed architecture needs to calculate with that and makes
therefore a – admittedly classic – distinction between static (compile-time) config-
uration and user’s (runtime) preferences. Static configuration is to be understood
as globally used non-changing variable properties such as the application name or
the hashing algorithm for the database password. It is up to the implementation
to manage its compile time preferences.
Preferences are dynamic settings of various parts of the application that the
user has to be able to change through the GUI at runtime. The architectural
specifications for user preferences are that they have to be stored as key-value
pairs of strings in the local application database (subsection 2.2.4). Strings have
been selected as they are descriptive and most commonly used3 versatile infor-
mation holders across all platforms. Naturally not all preferences are of string
type, thus preferences have to have beside a default string value also a type. The
type of the preference defines the value’s class in the given programming language
so that the value can be converted (typed) to e.g. a platform native boolean or
number type from the string it is stored in. Default values may be empty but the
preference should be then set in the initial set-up phase of the application.
An implementation has to support all preferences listed in Table B.1 (p.78). It
may add custom preferences if needed to. Other implementations can ignore the
3For example Windows INI files or Android’s SharedPreferences class use strings as keys.
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unknown preference keys in situations like importing a database that was created
by a different implementation. To avoid such complications an implementation
may decide to support also local, platform-specific preferences (e.g. INI files)
to outsource the storage of additional preferences outside the database. How-
ever no sensitive data like credentials or security settings should be stored there
unprotected.
2.2.4 Database and utility classes
As stated previously, the GUI layer may access the application’s logic either
through events or utility classes. Utility classes should be in most cases classes
containing only static helper methods and variables within a generic context.
They are often unavoidable as part of the effort to not repeat code of oneself and
as such shouldn’t be hidden from the upper layers or hindered by events.
The database component in the logic layer is responsible for persisting data
and providing it to the application. Data in this context means anything the ap-
plication needs to save between individual runs, for example contact information
or user preferences. To carry out this task effectively the conceptual proposition
is that the database component should be a hybrid between a utility class and a
controller. Merely using events to retrieve or store datasets would yield no ad-
vantage, only performance loss and added complexity. Theoretically it would be
required to use always at least two events – one being the request specifying the
dataset to retrieve or save and another one to return the dataset or confirm its (un-
)successful write to the database in case of inserting. Also the responsibility for
data organization lies exclusively on a single component which in this case makes
events partly obsolete. Therefore it is more practicable to view the database as
a singleton utility class in which case other components may easily call its static
methods to perform CRUD (Create-Read-Update-Delete) operations. Obviously
all operations have to be synchronized using either programmatic locks or some
other kind of transaction mechanism to prevent data inconsistency.
The database component should be a hybrid solution in the sense that it has
traits of a controller as it should register itself as a static singleton listener to
receive events. More specific it has to register for the SYSTEM EXIT event type
to recognize when the application is about to exit and data should be written to
disk. Another event type is SYSTEM PERSIST DATA which has to be invoked either
periodically or in certain situations that may require data persistence. It is up to
the implementation to decide in which situations this applies (e.g. on minimizing
the GUI or adding a contact). Triggering the event should have the effect of
saving the current database state without closing the database connection and
destroying the listener object.
There are more event types to be handled by the component as the database
component serves also for authentication purposes. They will be explained in
section 2.3 along with the data security design.
Of course, the attractiveness of the events concept is that the implementation
is free to handle the approach of being a data provider in another way as long as
all required data is kept consistent and all required events are serviced properly.
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Figure 2.3 shows an entity-relationship (E-R) diagram of all data objects that
need to be persisted by the application (their meaning will be specified through-
out the text). It is not relevant to the final implementation that the figure is an
E-R diagram as it does not mean that it has to use a relational database, the E-R
form is just for illustration. In fact the approach prescribed by the architecture
is quite different and uses the Google Protocol Buffers (GPB) data interchange
format. Developed by Google Inc. protocol buffers are an extensible language
and platform neutral technology for serializing structured data. Protocol buffers
use so called prototype objects (or “messages“) to hold data in named fields.
Fields have a name, a data type and can be optional, required or repeated. They
are defined in textual form in .proto files which look much alike a CORBA IDL4
file. Proto files are converted to data access classes in the specified programming
language by the protoc compiler. These classes can be then used programmat-
ically and also converted to a byte stream and read back from one. In Google
protocol buffers language terms this is referred to as “building“ and “parsing“
the message. For a full reference on protocol buffers please consult [3].
The protocol buffers data format was chosen as the best fit for the required data
structure, speed and portability among other competing approaches. Table 2.1
compares data formats and technologies that were considered in the analysis for
storing data. Main criteria for selection were:
1. The ability to process the format on different platforms, namely Microsoft
Windows & Windows Phone, GNU Linux, Apple iOS and Google Android.
2. Does the technology support CRUD operations in forms of queries?
3. The speed of serialization (write) and de-serialization (read).
4. The comparative amount of required space to store the data. That is given
mainly by two factors - the size of the metadata (such as indexes or markup
tags) and the data itself (e.g. compressed binary vs. text form).
5. The technology’s ability to read files that were stored within an older data
scheme (version). This is important due to being able to import or read
older files with a newer version of the application without specifically cus-
tomizing the code for each version.
6. Other unique disadvantages or benefits of the technology.
Please note that the table’s column values reflecting points 3. and 4. regarding
the speed and required space of each solution are only relative estimates of the
author due to a lack of comparison material of such a wide range of technologies.
Having this table made the decision process fairly straightforward in favour of
protocol buffers. The reasoning behind this decision is that a custom solution to
serialize data for storage would mean a lot of work to invest in something that
4CORBA, or Common Object Request Broker Architecture, is a middleware architecture;







































No No Medium Medium Partially
Java
only
Table 2.1: Comparison of data formats
already exists and is tested by time and other users. The Java serialization tech-
nique is as the name already says for Java only which limits the multi-platform
abilities significantly. Also while being backwards compatible the compatibility
is quite limited as for example it is not able to read objects in a newer version
that lack an attribute present in an older version ([4] section 5.6.1 Incompatible
Changes). While XML could work around this problem (e.g. by making all ele-
ments optional) it still has drawbacks in comparison to protocol buffers. Quoting
from [5] “Protocol buffers have many advantages over XML for serializing struc-
tured data. Protocol buffers:
• are simpler
• are 3 to 10 times smaller
• are 20 to 100 times faster
• are less ambiguous
• generate data access classes that are easier to use programmatically“
These advantages clearly favour GPB over XML. The last considered solution
was SQLite, a light and embedded version the SQL relational database manage-
ment system (RDMS). It fulfils all criteria and in addition to GPB is queryable as
being non-queryable is the most striking weak point of protocol buffers. Despite
this protocol buffers were chosen as the best solution available as encrypting data
in SQLite databases would have either to use a difficult cell-by-cell encryption
or encrypt the whole database file at once. While encrypting whole databases
would be a valid solution it offers no other benefits such as integrity checks of
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the encrypted database or backwards compatible versioning. Also only propri-
etary commercial solutions for encrypting SQLite databases are available (such
as SQLCipher [6]). The tipping point was that SQLite databases can be used
only for storing data locally as they are not a data exchange format. Protocol
buffers on the other hand are one and will be used in the architecture not only
for data storage but repeatedly also as the basic building block for most of the
data transfers.
As the security of the solution is tightly tied to the used technology it will be
explained in section 2.3 together with how exactly the architecture defines its
data structure using the protocol buffers format.
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Figure 2.3: Database E-R diagram
2.3 Secure data storage and authentication
The previous chapter analysed reasons behind using Google protocol buffers
as the choice for data storage. This chapter focuses on the specifications for the
database in this format as well as what security measures have to be taken to
ensure data safety and integrity. In addition it will look into how user authenti-
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cation is related to the database component.
In order to achieve security in terms of data storage the proposed architecture
has to solve
a) Data confidentiality by encryption to ensure persisted data cannot be mean-
ingfully read and interpreted by 3rd parties.
b) Data integrity to ensure persisted data was not tampered by a 3rd party
between application runs.
c) Authentication which is responsible to ensure that only authorized entities
may open and decrypt the database file successfully.
Figure 2.4 portraits the proposed security scheme to accomplish all three goals.
Basically the scheme uses a password based authentication and involves multiple
steps between saving the database data and writing it to a physical storage device
(and back). The first step is to take the in-memory data entities and serialize
them into a single byte stream. This is achieved by building a DatabaseData
protocol buffer message (defined in Listing 2.2) and filling the appropriate fields
- which in substance is only the root User entity as defined in Figure 2.4. The
User message itself has fields corresponding to other database entities. In turn
each database entity has a corresponding protocol message format defined so it
can be included in the User message. Sources of remaining .proto files are too
extensive to be listed in the thesis text and are therefore stored on the attached
CD-ROM (Appendix D, p.83).
The serialized byte stream obtained from the built DatabaseData message
object is additionally compressed with the GZIP algorithm before it is sent to
the cryptographic and data integrity unit. Compression serves two purposes –
for one it conserves disk space and for one it partially hides patterns in the
“plaintext“ (the byte stream) that could be exploited for a cryptanalytic attack
([7]). The compressed byte stream represents the input for the cryptographic
and data integrity unit. The cryptographic unit is responsible for encrypting and
decrypting the byte stream with a provided 256 bit password using the 256 bit
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetric algorithm. The same password
is used in the data integrity unit that creates a signature by employing a hash-
based message authentication code (HMAC). The signature will serve as a proof of
data integrity and authenticity when loading the database file back into memory.
After the encryption is done and the signature is calculated the byte streams
are stored in the appropriate fields of the Database message along with other
properties such the database scheme version and a string describing the HMAC
algorithm used for the signature. The Database .proto message is shown also in
Listing 2.2. Finally the Database message is built and its byte stream form is
saved onto a storage device (e.g. hard-drive).
Reading the database means reverting the whole process where instead of con-
verting protocol buffer messages into byte streams the byte streams are parsed
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Figure 2.4: Database component security scheme
into the messages. Also the HMAC signature/hash is built again from the plain-
text (DatabaseData message byte stream) and the password and compared to
the one stored in the Database message. If the hashes do not match the saved
byte stream of the Database object has been either damaged or tampered with
and the loading process should stop with an error message.
1 message DatabaseData {
2 optional int64 lastUpdateTimestamp = 1;
3 repeated User users = 2;
4 }
6 message Database {
7 required int32 version = 1;
8 required bytes data = 2;
9 required string dataSignatureAlgorithm = 3;
10 required bytes dataSignature = 4;
11 optional string primeIndexMap = 5;
12 }
Listing 2.2: Database wrapper in Google protocol buffers code
The password used in both ways in the cryptographic and data integrity unit is
always the same due to the symmetric nature of the algorithms used in both units.
It is 256 bits strong and a result of the SHA-256 hashing function that combines
three inputs. The first input is the username the user enters at application set-up
and serves as the cryptographic salt together with the third input which is the
current device’s identification (ID) number. It is up on the HAL implementation
to return a unique ID number of the device, for instance on desktop PCs this
may the serial number or on mobile phones this could be the International Mobile
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number. It may be empty if no such number can be
determined.
Since the first and last inputs are static the middle (second) part of the pass-
word has to be dynamic. The second part is therefore the actual password the
user has to choose at set-up time and then always enter on a login screen before
the database is to be decrypted and loaded. Thereby his identity (or at least
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knowledge of the password) is verified. The password is not a simple personal
identification number (PIN) or a string pass phrase but a mapping between pre-
selected prime number indexes and their power. More exactly the user has to
enter the power of each “index“. An index is a sequence number which is at
set-up time mapped randomly to a prime number. The middle password part is
then calculated as the product of all primes to the power of the number entered
by the user (the password). It is the responsibility of the Prime-index mapper
component to write the initial random mapping to the database object and sup-
ply it to the password calculation method on every following database loading
process. The mapping is to be stored in the primeIndexMap field of the Database
message as a serialized string which must have the form of the index for a given
prime in order separated with the “|“ character. For example the serialized string
“1|2|0|3“ would mean that prime with the ID zero (0) is assigned to index one
(1), prime with ID 1 is assigned to index 2, ID 2 to 0 and so on... Figure 2.5
illustrates this example mapping together with an example calculation for the
middle part of the password using colors to identify indexes.
At first glance this may seem overly complicated however it is in short no more
than an algorithm that utilizes the Chinese remainder theorem ([8]) to build a
big prime product number (password) that is hard to factorize and therefore
hard to break5. In addition salts are added to prevent rainbow attacks as the
final password is a SHA-256 hash due to the requirement of the cryptographic
and data integrity units which need a 256 bit password to function properly.
Listing 2.3 shows the whole process in pseudo-code.
Figure 2.5: Example password calculation and prime-index map
(“1|2|0|3“ in serialized form)




2 byte[] username ,
3 Map <Integer , Integer > password ,
4 Map <Integer , Integer > primeIndexMap)
5 {
6 Integer pwd = 1;
7 for (Integer index : password.keySet ())
8 {
9 Integer indexCount = password.get(index);
10 if (indexCount != null && indexCount > 0)
11 {
12 Integer prime = PrimeIndexMapper.getPrimeById(
13 primeIndexMap.get(index));
14 prime = prime ^ indexCount;
15 pwd = pwd * prime;
16 }
17 }
18 byte[] deviceId = HAL.getSystemInfo ().getDeviceId ();
20 byte[] finalDbPassword =
21 Bytes.concat(username , pwd.toByteArray (), deviceId);
22 finalDbPassword = SHA256(finalDbPassword);
23 return finalDbPassword;
24 }
Listing 2.3: Final password calculating function (Java code)
Figure 2.5 uses small primes for illustration purposes, however the primes used
in the final implementation have to be big enough to make a factorization near
to impossible (at the current state of hardware and algorithms). It may use for
example the Mersenne primes 12 to 19 (which corresponds to a range from 2127-1
up to 24253-1, see [9]) or any other primes as long as they are big enough and
equal on all platform implementations to ensure portability of the database file.
The primes should be part either of the static configurations of the application or
included in the Database message (which would mean to add an optional field).
This applies also to adding more primes (and therefore indexes) than eight which
is the minimum. The password itself should consist of at least 3 primes with a
count of all index values greater or equal to six to ensure sufficient security.
Using the described approach has an added benefit besides the harder factor-
ization of the password than using a simple PIN. As the password consists only
of a mapping between the index and the number of times it has been selected it
may be presented to the user in various forms. The form used in the example
used colors but other forms are thinkable such as mapping the indexes to a PIN
pad or a pattern-screen lock.
The username and the prime-index mapping are set up at the initial run of
the application. They may change in time if the application is running and the
new prime-index mapping is stored so the database can be encrypted with the
new encryption key or password respectively. The initial set-up is to be recog-
nized by the database component by listening to additional events to the ones
mentioned in subsection 2.2.4. Namely the SECURITY USER FIRST SETUP,
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SECURITY USER AUTH and SECURITY USER LOGOUT event types have
to be registered by the component. It is recommended that the database compo-
nent uses holder objects as parameters for the event types due to the limitation
of events being able to carry only a single argument.
SECURITY USER FIRST SETUP is to be sent after the user fills all required
fields to initialize the database the first time. It has to carry at least the user-
name, the password as an integer-to-integer map (for each index and its power)
and credentials for the SIP account (see 2.4.3). SECURITY USER AUTH events
have to carry the username and password as in the previous event and are to
be sent on each application start-up to log in the user. Log-in in this con-
text means that if the final (hashed) password is correct the decrypting and
loading of the database file succeeds and the component has to respond with
the SECURITY USER AUTH OK event so the application may start up its
regular operations. Otherwise the component has to respond with a SECU-
RITY USER AUTH FAILED event which should signal the user that either the
entered password was wrong or any other cause that may have caused this error
such as a malformed database file.
2.4 Secure data transfer
Just as secure data storage is important to the architecture design so is data
transfer. This chapter discusses the proposed design to provide just that start-
ing with an analysis of available channels and methods for data transportation
in subsection 2.4.1. As data security is not thinkable without data encryption
subsection 2.4.2 handles ways of exchanging keys. With an emphasis on secure
VoIP calls sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 focus on the data transmission and how it is
controlled. However the approach shown will not be exclusive to voice calls and
generic enough to incorporate video, text messaging and other data transfers if
desirable.
2.4.1 Available channels
In this chapter an analysis of available data exchange channels is discussed.
A channel in this context is any way two devices with the secure communicator
application installed may exchange binary data. As the main feature of the se-
cure communicator is to carry encrypted voice data first the needed bandwidth
required for a channel needed to be calculated. For this purpose any full-duplex
channel capable of continuous streaming with a bandwidth above 128 kbit/s
(kb/s, or 16 kB/s) will be considered compliant. The number is derived from
a simple calculation where the highest used bitrate by usually used audio codecs
is 64 kbit/s demanded by the wide-band G.722 codec. All other codecs use a
smaller or equal bitrate as depicted for example in [10]. To be on the safe side
this number has been doubled to cover data transmission overhead introduced
by wrapping the voice samples into packets and by the taken security measures
as described in subsection 2.4.4. Of course transmitting other types of data such
as video calls or larger files may require a faster connection but for now only the
critical voice call feature is to be considered.
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Since the data transfer is encrypted slower or even one way channels that
could be used for exchanging encryption keys of two parties are considered. For
this any channel capable of transmitting a 2 kB block of data is to be considered
applicable (2 kB is the defined upper bound for a serialized Contact entity which
holds the public keys and other contact information as described in the following
chapter). In addition streaming capabilities of the channel are not a prerequisite
because the key is exchanged only once in a single transaction e.g. taking a
picture of a QR code with a camera.
Table 2.2 summarizes channels available on most current smartphones and
desktop computers. The table is split into a listing of channels capable of a si-
multaneous two way communication and one way only channels. The latter case is
hence a (non-exhaustive) list of actuator/sensor combinations. The data transfer
speeds and range values presented in the table are taken from the official spec-
ifications and may vary in some cases greatly depending on the exact hardware
device and protocol or technology version used. Also factors like signal quality
influence the overall speed but the numbers give at least an approximation of the
order in which the channel operates.
The protocols column lists standardized protocols or data formats which can
be used on the particular channel. The “Network“ value means the channel
supports network protocols such as TCP/IP or UDP. The last column indicates
by an OK sign (“X“) or an “x“ sign whether the given channel meets or meets
not the given bandwidth criteria for voice and encryption key/contact information
transfers.
It is obvious that the “traditional“ connection types using an ethernet/DSL,
wireless (Wi-Fi) or 3G mobile network meet the set requirements. In case of Wi-
Fi however it depends greatly on what connection is the Wi-Fi router hooked up
to. For example if the router is bound to a slow 64 kb/s ISDN modem the channel
is effectively unusable, although in that case it is thinkable that if both parties are
in the given range only the local network is used or an ad-hoc network is created.
2G mobile networks may theoretically be usable for voice data depending on
the exact network type (EDGE vs. GPRS) but it is questionable whether the
theoretical data rate will be achieved in practice. Also network latency may
become an issue in this case.
While the remaining three channels (USB, Bluetooth and NFC) fulfill the
bandwidth limitation for voice calls they are strongly limited by their range and
cannot be recommended for voice data since it would be easier just to speak to
the remote party in person. However they may be used for safely transmitting
other types of binary data such as documents and public keys. USB is in this
point of view a special case as it could be used only as a proxy channel for a
shared internet connection (USB-tethering).
The one way channels suffer from the same range restriction as the previous
three and are even slower. Thereby they should be used for offline key exchange
only.
Regarding the final implementation for Android smartphones it should use at









































































Table 2.2: Comparison of data transfer channels
when people meet in person. A realizable method seems to be scanning QR codes
from a second device’s screen (provided both devices posses a camera). Other
combinations or methods may be possible and are encouraged. For voice data
transmissions the fast enough wireless and 3G mobile networks should be used
preferably as smartphones usually do not provide Ethernet cable jacks.
2.4.2 Public keys exchange
A goal of the thesis was to secure the data exchange between two endpoints
without a central authority that would provide key exchange or identity verifica-
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tion which by principle would be the weak point in the overall security scheme.
In response to that requirement the decision fell immediately on public key cryp-
tography that can provide the needed decentralized authentication and public
key infrastructure. The following text assumes knowledge of both topics. An
overview on public key cryptography can be obtained from [11] or [12].
There exist many standards and approaches to asymmetric key cryptography
and exchange and one that would fit both the security requirements and the
architecture of the secure communicator had to be selected. As such the seasoned
and freely available OpenPGP standard according to RFC 4880 was chosen due
to its proven reliability and stable implementations. The alternative choice, the
X.509 standard (RFC 2510) was disqualified due to the need of central certificate
authority. The Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange method on the other hand,
whether standalone or included in the ZRTP (RFC 6189) standard, is not really
structured for authentication purposes and would serve only for key agreement
of the data transmission. Since identity verification must be done at an earlier
stage (signalling the data transfer) both of these solutions were inadequate. In
comparison to that the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) suite and its OpenPGP
standard provide a complete cryptographic system.
This concludes that every user that wishes to be part of the secure communica-
tor network must possess a public PGP key ring together with its secret (private)
counterpart. Due to the principle of public key cryptography the public part needs
to be distributed to each party that the user wishes to communicate with before
the communication takes place. Since the architecture cannot rely on a central
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authority (server) to do that, the exchange has
to be facilitated in channels suitable for public key exchange as discussed in the
previous chapter. The proposition is therefore to use a common data format for
the key exchange that is versatile enough for all channels in consideration. Such
a format is defined as follows:
Contact information along with the public PGP key ring is stored in the
Contact protocol buffer message as displayed in Listing 2.4. This message is
identical to the database entity for contacts which allows for easy import and
export of contact information directly into or from the database – including our
contact information which is of the same type (stored in the userinfo field of the
User message). Public PGP key rings are to be stored as byte encoded arrays in
the publicPGPKeyRing field. The optional (including repeated) fields of the
message may be left blank but all fields should be editable in the GUI after the
contact message has been transferred from one user to another. The transporta-
tion channel is free to be chosen by the implementation however it must use a
built Contact protocol buffer message wrapped into a Base 64 encoded string.
Base 64 encoding ensures that the built message in form of binary data may
be transported over channels that use textual unicode or even ASCII encoding
modes of operation.
The public PGP key ring must contain at least two keys. The first key must
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be a master signing key while the second key must be an encryption sub-key6.
The keys however must not be exclusively only for signing or encryption, they
may employ general algorithms suitable for both operations. Both keys should be
at least 1024 bit strong and use the RSA encryption algorithm by default. The
digital signature algorithm (DSA) should also be supported (because of imported
key rings). Additional keys with arbitrary properties are allowed in the key ring
and are to be ignored. When importing a contact message into the database,
the presence, the expiration time and correctness of both required keys has to be
checked.
The TrustLevel attribute is an enumeration with the following allowed values:
NONE, LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH. It indicates subjective trust the user applies
to a given contact. When exporting the contacts message belonging to the current
user the value should be overwritten to NONE so the recipient is made aware to
customize the trust setting. It has no effect on the encryption or application logic
and serves for informational purposes only. In the future this field may be used
to establish a PGP web-of-trust model.
1 message Contact {
2 required int64 id = 1;
3 required string username = 2;
4 required string sipUsername = 3;
5 required bytes publicPGPKeyRing = 4;
6 optional TrustLevel trustLevel = 5;
7 optional bytes avatar = 6;
8 optional string email = 7;
9 repeated PhoneNumber phoneNumbers = 8;
10 }
Listing 2.4: Protocol buffer message for a contact (shortened)
Figure 2.6 contains a sample contact QR tag with the Base 64 encoded Contact
message. Sharing contact information through QR codes implies clearing the
avatar field of the Contact message due to the limit of data a QR code can
carry.
Using QR codes in conjunction with the display as the key exchange channel
eliminates the risk of a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack because the users
have to be in physical contact range to scan the code with their device. Using
other transport channels the exchange itself may or may not be encrypted with
a temporary session key (such as a PIN similar to when two Bluetooth devices
are connecting) to prevent Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. This however is
not a “hard“ requirement as the users can always check the incoming PGP key
ring’s fingerprint.
Users however must be given the choice to exchange the whole contact or just
import the public PGP key ring part into an existing or a newly created contact.
6Note that using two keys is also the recommended approach in other OpenPGP implemen-
tations such as GnuPG or the PGP suite.
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Figure 2.6: Sample QR code with contact/PGP data
This is needed in order to replace revoked or expired PGP keys and various day-
to-day reasons (mainly backwards compatibility). Exchanging plain key rings
must be though dealt with by the user himself and is outside the scope of this
architectural proposition.
Each public PGP key ring naturally needs a secret counterpart to create sig-
natures and decrypt incoming data. The secret PGP key ring must be either
imported together with the public one or created anew. This has to happen
together with the initial database creation so the fields in the database can be
correctly used at first start-up already. Users should be able to import any exist-
ing PGP key ring as long as it fulfils the specifications on the master signing and
encryption sub-key and of course has the according credentials for the given key
ring. The secret key ring is to be stored in database in the pgpSecretKeyRing
field of the User database entity along with the PGP username (pgpUsername
field) and password (pgpPassword field).
The next chapters explain how and when both of the key rings are put to use.
2.4.3 Signalling plane
Before a secure data transmission can start there are three things to be con-
sidered in the architecture. First the application needs to locate the remote party
the user wishes to communicate with and signal it a request to establish a data
connection. Secondary the identity of the remote party needs to be verified (on
both ends) and only then the transmission may start if accepted. At last the
data transmission has to be encrypted and prior to that session keys must be ex-
changed. Session keys are in contrast to asymmetric public keys used only once
per data transfer session and hence their name. Due to the expected amount of
data it is a) not possible to use the comparatively slow asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms directly and b) it is safer to use a random temporary, one-shot key
28
(provided using a secure random number generator). Therefore session keys are
destined for symmetric cryptographic algorithms such as AES.
Because of this distinction the data transmission can be split in two planes.
The signalling plane is responsible for locating, contacting and verifying the re-
mote user and uses asymmetric cryptography (OpenPGP more precisely). Mean-
while the media plane is the lowest layer where the data itself is exchanged in
encrypted form using symmetric encryption algorithms.
It is not a coincidence that the terms signalling and media plane are used as
they are common to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). SIP is the protocol of
choice which the secure communicator uses in the signalling layer. Alternatives
to SIP will be discussed at the end of this chapter. Describing the detailed
functioning of the Session initiation protocol is outside the scope of this thesis
text so please refer to exhaustive guides to SIP in general, its message flows and
response codes in [13] and [14]. Full specifications are located in the RFC 3261
[15].
A SIP proxy/registrar server is the backbone of the SIP signalling plane as it
keeps a registry of all connected user agent clients (UAC) and routes requests
between them. UACs in this case are active users who have started the secure
communicator application and are able to participate in a communication. It is
important to note that while by using a SIP server a central element is introduced
into the architecture it has only a supporting function. In regards to the overall
security scheme the server itself has no substantial effect on authentication or data
encryption mechanisms except that it relays the messages required to establish a
data transfer session.
Since the secure communicator must cope with SIP related situations the ar-
chitecture contains a number of events associated with SIP. A controller – the
SIP stack – must be responsible for interpreting and translating internal events
into SIP requests and responses and of course the other way around. Basically
there are four of these situations the SIP stack has to consider:
1. Initializing the SIP stack
2. Registering the UAC at the SIP server. This includes registration refreshes
before the registration entry expires in the registry.
3. Incoming call or other data transfer.
4. Outgoing call or other data transfer.
Because SIP is a state based protocol the SIP stack object has to keep track
of its state to properly respond to requests. Figure 2.7 shows a state diagram of
a SIP stack according to the four situations and how the stack switches between
them based on received or sent SIP messages. The state transitions are condi-
tioned by an incoming SIP event denoted in square brackets (“[]“). The event
may have three origins – a user action, an incoming SIP request or an incom-
ing SIP response (numeric code) to a previous request. An initialized SIP stack
begins in the STACK INITIALIZED state from where it automatically tries to
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register itself at the SIP registrar server. Should the registration succeed the
stack idles in the IDLE state until a registration refresh fails, an incoming call is
signalized (INVITE type message) or an outgoing call is requested by the user.
The WAIT PROV and WAIT FINAL states are used on outgoing calls whereas
the RINGING and WAIT ACK states are used on incoming calls. The ESTAB-
LISHED event is common for both occasions and indicates that the session was
successfully established and the media packets containing voice data are being
sent and received.
Figure 2.7: SIP stack state diagram according to SIP events
From the applications perspective however the SIP stack becomes operational
after an initiating SIP INIT event which has to be sent after the user logs in
successfully (on SECURITY USER AUTH OK event response) so the SIP stack
may read the user’s preferences from the database. The controller should load
any required configurations, classes and libraries in order to be ready to receive or
send SIP messages. If the initialization succeeds or the stack is already loaded the
SIP INIT OK event has to be sent in response. Otherwise the SIP INIT FAILED
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event has to be sent. This applies also to the SIP RESET event which (if the
stack was loaded before) should de-register the UAC from the server, unload the
stack, end the current call in progress (if any) and reinitialize it as if a SIP INIT
event would be sent. The SIP RESET event should be triggered by an incoming
NET CONNECTION ESTABLISHED event which signals that the underlying
network connection has changed and the SIP stack needs to be reinitialized with
a new IP address and a corresponding registration request.
Figure 2.8 extends the original state diagram in Figure 2.7 to display the SIP
stack state transitions from the application’s point of view (that is in form of
events). This means that every state transition from the STACK INITIALIZED
state upwards represents a mapping between SIP messages and application events
and vice versa. The square brackets indicate the direction of the event where
[in] stands for incoming events and [out] for outgoing events (from the stack’s
perspective).
To not overload the diagram it is missing some transitions from the in-call
states to the IDLE state on a CALL ERROR event which indicates a software or
hardware failure. The same applies for the SIP RESET event where transitions
from all states (except the starting one) to STACK NOT INITIALIZED should
be present.
The security aspect of this signalling architecture is integrated in the IDLE
to WAIT ACK state transitions logic for incoming calls and the WAIT FINAL
to ESTABLISHED state transition logic for outgoing calls. This is due the fact
that the application logic of these transitions operates on SIP INVITE messages
that are used for establishing a SIP session. To these messages (or the 200
OK responses to them) a session description protocol (SDP, RFC 4566) message
body is attached which is usually used to negotiate the destination IP address
and port for media packets as well as the audio codec to be used and other
session parameters. It is here, before the media transmission itself, where the
architecture’s security related measures are hooked into. The security hook has
two tasks – a) exchange of session cryptographic keys and parameters and b) the
authentication of the remote party that sent the invite or the positive response
to it. This is achieved by a little modification of the purpose of the key (“k:“)
field in the sent SDP messages (or “piggy backing“ if you will). While this field is
normally also used for key exchange the data format the design prescribes is based
on an encrypted and Base 64 encoded SipCryptoSpecsAttachment prototype
buffer message. The message as shown in the source file Listing 2.5 carries all
cryptographic parameters needed for securing the data sent in the media plane
(basically task a)).
Note that the fields defining the data integrity hashing algorithm for the data
packets are the optional digestAlgorithm and hMacAlgorithm/hMacKey fields
and only one of them must be set at a time (since only one method can be
used at once). The session key and the initialization vector must be randomly
generated by a secure random number generator and their size must match the
algorithm used (e.g. 256 bit). Now because the SipCryptoSpecsAttachment
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Figure 2.8: Application events according to the SIP stack state
message contains sensitive session information it must be protected from attackers
that would try to read or modify it. Therefore the message is serialized into a
byte array which is then encrypted with the receiver’s PGP public encryption
sub-key. The encrypted data is then signed with the private PGP master signing
key of the sender. The encryption ensures data confidentiality while the signing
ensures data integrity and authenticity (task b)). At last the final signed and
encrypted byte array is encoded in Base 64 so it can be included as the string
value of SDP message key field (see Figure 2.9).
32
1 message SipCryptoSpecsAttachment {
2 required string cryptoAlgorithm = 1;// Symmetric algorithm
3 required string blockMode = 2; // Block mode
4 required string padMode = 3; // Padding mode
5 required bytes sessionKey = 4; // Session key
6 optional bytes iv = 5; // Initialization vector
8 // Digest or HMAC (optional)
9 optional string digestAlgorithm = 6;
10 optional string hMacAlgorithm = 7;
11 optional bytes hMacKey = 8;
12 required int64 timestamp = 9;
13 }
Listing 2.5: SipCryptoSpecsAttachment protocol buffer message
The basic idea of secure session establishment is therefore based on piggy-
backing session data and using asymmetric PGP encryption and signatures to
secure it. The complete process of the whole security hook is more complicated
and thereby recapitulated in the following list. From the session initiator’s point
of view the responsibilities of the SIP stack are in order:
1. Retrieve the contact the user tries to establish a data session to from the
database.
2. Build a SipCryptoSpecsAttachment message and fill the fields based on
the user’s data encryption preferences. Update the timestamp field with
the current timestamp (section 2.5 explains why).
3. Build an INVITE message with a SDP message body. Set the needed SDP
fields (audio codec etc.) and fill the “k:“field value with the encrypted and
signed SipCryptoSpecsAttachment object as described previously.
4. Send the INVITE to the contact’s SIP address through the SIP server and
wait for provisional (1XX) or final (200 to 600) response. Notify the SIP
stack to not accept any messages that are not from the address we try to
contact.
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Figure 2.9: Session key exchange message layers
Now on the receiver side, assuming his SIP stack is idling and no other session
is in progress, the process is as follows:
1. On an incoming INVITE request check that the sender is in our database.
If yes, retrieve the contact information and continue in 2). If not, deny the
call automatically with a 433 (anonymity disallowed) error response code.
2. Decode the SDP message body. If none is found or it contains errors, deny
the call with a 421 (extension required) response code. It the audio codec is
not supported, deny it with 411 (unsupported media type) response code.
3. Decrypt the SipCryptoSpecsAttachment from the key field of the SDP
attachment. If none is found return again with 421 code. If the decryption
with the user’s private PGP encryption sub-key fails signal it to the remote
party with a 493 (undecipherable) error code and go back to idle. The same
applies if the PGP signature (including data integrity protection) could not
be verified or the signature’s PGP key ID could not be matched to the
remote contact’s public signing key.
4. The time difference between the current time and the timestamp field value
of the decrypted SipCryptoSpecsAttachment object must be less than 1
hour (should be configurable). If it is more, show a replay attack warning
to the user in point 5).
5. Only if all conditions were met signal the user an incoming call and send a
provisional 180 response.
6. Should the user accept the call, send a 200 OK response with a new
SDP/SipCryptoSpecsAttachment attachment. The new SipCryptoSpecs-
Attachment object is to be built similarly to the previous description. The
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audio codec value must be copied from the incoming session description
parameters.
7. Notify the SIP stack to not accept any messages that are not from the
address that tried to contact us. Wait for the final acknowledgment (ACK)
request from the session initiator. Start a timeout which expires after 30
seconds by default (should be configurable). If no ACK confirmation is
received the timer must set the SIP stack back to idle and notify the user.
Back on the sender’s side the stack is waiting for a response to continue the
process. Should the receiver deny a call for some reason end the connection effort
and notify the user with an error message corresponding to the received 4XX
code. If a positive (200 OK) response is received the stack must exercise the same
security checks as described on the receiver’s side (points 1. to 4. in the previous
list) only instead if the INVITE request the 200 OK response is processed. Also
any failures do not result in sending 4XX codes back to the receiver but instead
letting the ACK timer on the receiver side expire. In this case the call must be
terminated immediately on the user’s side with an appropriate error message. If
the receivers response is verified the session is to be considered as established by
sending the ACK request.
Additional security measures and SIP server analysis
Additional security measures to the otherwise insecure (plain-text) session
initiation protocol include that each SIP message should be communicated over
a secured TLS connection established to the SIP server. As a second level fail-
safe each message must be signed with a PGP certificate created by the message
sender and verified by the receiver to prevent an attacker of sending false com-
mands. This insures message authenticity and integrity. The certificates should
be basically a hash value computed from the attributes of the SIP message and
must include a current (universal time) timestamp to prevent message replay
attacks. Messages that have a valid certificate but a timestamp older than one
hour must be discarded automatically. For call initiating messages the applica-
tion should display the normal call accept/end screen but with a warning saying
that the request is outdated and therefore probably forged.
At the moment the PGP signature conditions should not apply to REGISTER
requests which are negotiated only with the SIP server as this would require
rewriting portions of the server code in order to check for these signatures. The
SIP registration process should be executed in the standardized way using digest
authentication (with MD5 hashes) as defined in the SIP RFC document ([15]).
See the security analysis section 2.5 on how this may impact the safety of the
signalling plane. Removing this requirement has also the effect of a free and
interchangeable selection of the SIP server software. After some research the
Open SIP Server or just OpenSIPS (formerly OpenSER, [16]) has been favored
over the lightweight MjSip proxy ([17]) which was the first choice for prototype
applications. OpenSIPS is in contrast to MjSip maintained by a professional
community and provides in addition to the standard components carrier-grade
features including SIP presence, messaging or load-balancing. Nevertheless the
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most critical functionality is that it can serve also as a SIP and media NAT
traversal unit which will be important for the media plane as explained in the
next chapter. In general though the final implementation is more or less free to
choose the SIP server implementation as long as it supports NAT traversal and
is conform to the RFC standards. It might be even possible to widen this free-
dom of choice to the whole signalling protocol selection since the architecture is
bound to events and not explicitly SIP messages. Would the architecture use for
example XMPP or H.323 signalling protocols only the mapping between events
and the appropriate message processing stack would have to change (disregarding
some minor data format and GUI changes). The media plane implementation is
abstracted from the signalling protocol and requires only secure session estab-
lishment and NAT traversal. In the end the reasons for selecting SIP were its
maturity, broad selection of server software and the compatibility option to most
existing VoIP applications. Also the option to use SIP alongside XMPP in the
future exists. A comprehensive comparison of SIP to XMPP can be found at [18].
2.4.4 Media plane
After the session has been established the application can be sure that the
remote party is authenticated, has accepted the transmission request and both
ends possess the correct session description parameters including session keys.
By sending (or receiving respectively) the final ACK request the data transmis-
sion on the negotiated ports must start. For the transmission itself the most
commonly used protocol in conjunction with SIP will be used - the Real-Time
transmission protocol (RTP). RTP is specified in RFC 3550 [19] and belongs to
the user datagram protocol (UDP) family.
The design will use the protocol “as-is“ with minor adjustments to the payload
format which has to be encrypted. It therefore does not adhere to the RTP
payload specifications as stated in RFC 3551. Instead, as anywhere else in the
architecture design, encrypted Google protocol buffer messages will be used as
the RTP packets payload data format (Listing 2.6).
1 message RtpPacketPayload {
2 required bytes data = 1;
3 repeated int32 framesSizes = 2 [packed=true];
4 optional bytes signature = 3;
5 optional int64 timeCreated = 4;
6 }
Listing 2.6: RtpPacketPayload protocol buffer message
The format is generic enough to carry voice, video or any other binary formats
requested by the application. All data is to be stored in the byte array data field
of the message. The data is basically anything what would be in the original
payload for an RTP packet if no encryption would be used, e.g. recorded audio
or video frames. When frames are used they are all packed one behind the other
in the data field. To split them on the receiver end correctly the framesSizes
field is an array of integers which define the size of each frame in bytes. If no
36
frames are used it may be left empty or contain only a single value. An additional
timestamp is stored in the timeCreated field to enable recorded calls playback.
After these fields are set a signature of the data is to be computed and stored
in the signature field. This is to detect modifications of the packets on their
way to the receiver. Signatures are in the form of hashes generated either by
digest or the more secure HMAC algorithms. The message is then to be built
and encrypted with the session key obtained from the SDP attachment sent by
the corresponding remote party in the negotiation process. The encrypted body
serves then as the RTP packet payload.
For calls the transmission should take place in at least two parallel processes,
one for processing incoming data and one for sending the recorded audio. Both
processes should be started in their own thread in order not to block the Event-
Handler and to process audio recording as well as playback simultaneously. The
processing of incoming RTP packets can be decomposed in the following steps:
1. Receive a RTP packet and queue it to prevent packet loss. The packets
should be sorted into a queue according to the RTP timestamp to catch
out of order packet deliveries.
2. Take a packet from the queue, decrypt the payload with the session key
and parse the RtpPacketPayload message from the bytes. If it cannot be
decrypted or the message cannot be built throw the packet away.
3. Calculate a hash of the data and timeCreated fields using the negotiated
algorithm and compare it against the hash in the signature field. If they do
not match throw the packet away as it has been damaged or tampered.
4. Check that the timestamp in the timeCreated field is in the allowed range
(e.g. ±10 minutes from now) to prevent replay attacks.
5. If the payload has the correct format and the origin of the sender and packet
has been verified split the data into frames with help of the framesSizes
array.
6. Decode each frame using the audio codec defined in the RTP payload type
header field or as established in the SDP body of the INVITE SIP message
(they have to match). The result should be pulse-coded modulation (PCM)
audio samples.
7. Obtain the audio playback device through HAL and play the samples. Re-
peat from point 1.) until a CALL END or CALL ERROR event is received
by the process. The process has of course to register itself as a runtime
listener in the event handler first.
Sending audio data is basically the reversed process of the previous one:
1. Record raw PCM samples from the recording device obtained through HAL
and encode them with the previously agreed on audio codec to frames.
Remember each frame size in an integer array and concatenate the frames
into a single byte array.
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2. After there are enough frames to fill the RTP payload build an RtpPack-
etPayload message and fill the data and framesSizes fields. The final RTP
packet must not be bigger than 1500 bytes which is the usual standard max-
imum transmission unit (MTU) for UDP packets. Therefore build a packet
when the concatenated frames are about 1 kB in total to leave room for
headers and other fields (plus some reserved space to be on the safe side).
3. Store the current timestamp in the timeCreated field. Calculate a hash of
the data and timeCreated fields and store the result in the signature field.
If the hash algorithm is a HMAC use the session key.
4. Build the protocol buffer message and encrypt it with the session key using
a symmetric algorithm as specified by the user’s preferences.
5. Create an RTP packet and set the correct payload type according to the
used audio codec along with other header fields. Send the packet through
an UDP socket to the receivers IP address.
6. Stop on CALL END or CALL ERROR event. Send a CALL ERROR event
in case the process is interrupted in some unexpected way.
A significant role in exchanging voice data has the audio codec. Audio codecs
usually compress the raw PCM samples or at least convert them to a standard
format (such as G.711). The implementation must support at least the narrow-
band speex codec [10] and both A-law and µ-law variants of the G.711 wideband
telephone codec. The user should be able to select a preferred codec for outgoing
calls (due to the SDP offer/accept mechanism the codec selection depends on the
settings of the caller, not the callee).
Encryption settings used in the processes on the other hand are defined sepa-
rately by each user and exchanged along with the session key in the SDP message
body (Figure 2.9). As a result the symmetric encryption algorithm for outgoing
data transmissions may be different or may have different specs than the incoming
transmission. Users should be able to select their preferred symmetric algorithm
from a predefined set and if applicable the cipher’s key size, block mode and
padding mode. The default preference should be set AES algorithm with a 128
bit key size in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode with public-key cryptography
standard #7 (PKCS7) padding.
The same logic applies to the hash algorithms where one user may select digest
hashes only and the other a HMAC algorithm. See also Table B.1 (p.78) for the
full names and settings of the user preferences.
This is beneficial e.g. in comparison to the secure variant of RTP (SRTP) as
each user defines the level of security for his data. Also SRTP uses only 128 bit
AES encryption with a SHA-1 HMAC (RFC 3711). The described approach sup-
ports a variety of other algorithms, many of them cryptographically stronger than
the ones used by SRTP and it is only up to the implementation to include them.
This was the main reason why a custom approach of data security was selected
over using the SRTP standard in spite compatibility issues (see section 2.6).
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The presented solution is versatile and may be easily modified for transferring
other data types. For example to include video calls the process logic would stay
the same, the only thing that would change is the used codecs and playback-
/recording devices. Nevertheless until UDP is used as the transportation layer
NAT traversal is an issue that had to be solved in the architecture. For that
the TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) approach has been adopted.
In short, it assumes a cooperation between the SIP server and a server software
named “rtpproxy“ (which is included in OpenSIPS as a pluggable module). In
conjunction they rewrite the destination IP addresses in the SDP message bodies
to the IP address of the rtpproxy server. Effectively this means the endpoints are
deceived on purpose to route all RTP traffic through the proxy instead of directly
to the remote party. This has the advantage that the RTP traffic is capable of
travelling through all types of NAT modes (even symmetric) at the cost of adding
a delay and utilizing resources for the rtpproxy. Hence in this case the priority
was set on 100% reachability rather than effectiveness. See [20] for full specifi-
cation on the TURN solution using OpenSIPS and a comparison to the STUN
(Simple Traversal of UDP through NAT) technology.
2.4.5 Call history and recording
Each data transmission should be logged for informational and auditing pur-
poses. As the architecture aims in this version mainly at voice calls, the call
history should be kept in the predefined structure as shown in Figure 2.3 where
every User entity has a list of CallLogEntry prototype buffer messages which
model the database entity (Listing 2.7). A controller should listen to events
starting with the CALL prefix and create and save a CallLogEntry entity for
each attempted or completed call. The entity has to be saved only after the call
ends to correctly set the call duration attribute. Attempted calls (such as missed
and denied calls or calls ended abruptly with a CALL ERROR event) should
have the duration field set to zero (0). The timestamp field should contain the
UNIX timestamp of the time when the first call event type was received and
updated when a call has been established (on CALL INCOMING ESTABLISED
or CALL OUTGOING ESTABLISED event). For whatever reason the call ends
the CallLogEntry entity has to be persisted in the database component with the
correct call direction attribute value selected from the CallDirection enumera-
tion. The contactId is a foreign key that holds the ID of the contact entity the
call was directed to or from.
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1 message CallLogEntry {
3 enum CallDirection {
4 INCOMING = 0;
5 INCOMING_MISSED = 1;
6 INCOMING_DENIED = 2;
7 OUTGOING = 3;
8 OUTGOING_CANCELED = 4;
9 OUTGOING_DENIED_OR_BUSY = 5;
10 }
12 required int64 contactId = 1; // foreign key to Contact.id
13 required int64 timestamp = 2;
14 required int32 duration = 3; // (in seconds)
15 required CallDirection direction = 4;
16 optional bool recorded = 5 [default = false ];
17 }
Listing 2.7: CallLogEntry protocol buffer message
The recorded flag has to be positive if the call or a part of it was recorded by the
user. The basic concept of call recording it that received and sent RTP packet pay-
loads holding the voice data (encrypted RtpPacketPayload message, see previous
chapter) are cloned to two arrays for incoming and outgoing packets. This starts
when the user is in-call and presses a recording button which results in sending a
CALL CURRENT RECORD START event. A controller has to be responsible
for processing events related to call recording as well as the recording logic. On
receiving the event the controller should signal the media transmission processes
to send it a clone of each packet payload (in the plain encrypted form). Success
or failure of initializing the recording process has to be signaled to the GUI with
an OK/ERROR event (see Table A.1, p.77). The recording may not be continu-
ous and can be stopped or paused with the CALL CURRENT RECORD STOP
event. Repeated sending of the events should cause the recording process be-
ing resumed or paused until the call ends. Not later than when the call ends
the recorded packets have to be put in the RecordedCallHolder prototype mes-
sage including a SHA-256 HMAC as the signature. The HMAC signature should
use the database password and hash the serialized RecordedCallPackets object
which holds the arrays with the RTP packet payloads. The RecordedCallHolder
object should then be serialized and flushed to an external storage drive. On suc-
cess metadata has to be written to the database. The metadata consists of copies
of the voice session properties including SDP message bodies and cryptographic
parameters for both data transmission directions. See the RecordedCall message
definition for details. All the aforesaid prototype buffer message definitions can
be found in the attachments section (Appendix D, p.83).
Note that recording a call is local to the endpoint. The other endpoint is not
notified of the recording. Also the metadata records in the database as well as
the recording file should perish if the corresponding user or call history entry is
removed from the database.
Users must also be able to replay their recorded calls. The playback is initiated
by the CALL RECORDED PLAYBACK START event type with the timestamp
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of the recording as the argument which is also the primary key of the CallLogEntry
entity. The responsible controller needs to check the HMAC signature of the whole
recording file and while in playback check also each replayed RTP packet pay-
load’s hash to ensure that the recording was not modified as it is not stored in the
database (only the metadata is). CALL RECORDED PLAYBACK PAUSE and
CALL RECORDED PLAYBACK STOP events should pause/resume and stop
the playback.
2.5 Security analysis
This chapter summarizes the security measures proposed by each component
of the architecture design and will look into possible attack vectors and security
threats (marked bold throughout the following text). It assumes at least basic un-
derstanding of current cryptography systems and algorithms as well as computer
security terminology (although this applies to the thesis as a whole).
As the cornerstone of the proposed security scheme is aimed at asymmetric
cryptography or more precisely on the Open PGP specification it is assumed
that as of today no fundamental publicly known security flaw in the principles of
the used (a)symmetric cipher algorithms and the PGP scheme itself is known. Of
course this may not apply to the program code implementations of the algorithms
which may or may not be flawed in terms of security. Furthermore it would be
outside the scope of this text to analyse each cipher and cryptosystem one by one
so please refer to the numerous existing publications on that topic (see for example
[21] which analyses PGP’s security). Instead the focus of the security analysis
lies on the usage of these secure algorithms in a given context and whether they
provide a compact defence system against known attacks. To summarize, the
following assumptions and simplifications are made in this analysis:
• A “cryptographically strong random number generator“ (RNG) is available.
This means it is not predictable or suggestible.
• Public key asymmetric cryptography using RSA and PGP is perfectly secure
if used correctly (a strong enough password provided).
• The AES symmetric encryption and SHA-2 HMAC algorithms are perfectly
secure to the degree of the quality of the password and the random number
generator used.
• No quantum computers are available to the attacker which would weaken
or render useless the deployed algorithms.
• Used third party libraries or software and cryptographic function imple-
mentations contain no back-doors or security flaws.
An additional note on the RNG: Since a “true“ RNG might not to be available
to an implementation it is assumed that the weaker “cryptographically strong“
random number generator is sufficient. A custom RNG implementation may be
developed in the final implementation e.g. by collecting and combining entropy
from files on the hard drive and built-in sensors like the gyroscope or compass
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(magnet field strength) sensor. However this is discouraged unless it can be
proven that the data is truly random and the RNG complies at least with the
“cryptographically strong“ specification as described in the FIPS 140-2: Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules and RFC 1750: Randomness Recom-
mendations for Security documents. Instead proper use of existing and verified
solutions such as Java’s SecureRandom class is recommended (see e.g. [22]).
Now when the security of the RNG is established almost all security features
unveil themselves from the user’s password and its strength. It is therefore to
be analysed first. As a reminder, the user’s password is the result of the SHA-256
hash method which input is the concatenated bytes of the username (at least 3
characters), a large factorized number (>2762) and the serial number of a device
(may be empty). The factorized number is calculated as the product of at least
six Mersenne prime numbers starting at the smallest used Mersenne prime 12. Its
value is 2127-1 so the declared power 762 of the factorized number comes from the
requirement of using at least 6 numbers for the password (6*127, see 2.3). The
final password is used to encrypt the database file with AES-256 and to create a
SHA-256 HMAC that ensures the integrity of the file.
Supposed an attacker managed to obtain the database file there are two ways
he could crack the user’s password. The first way is a direct brute-force attack
on one of the algorithms which is mathematically proven to fail with current (or
even near-future) hardware equipment. Failing in this sense means that while
this attack would theoretically yield a result it is impractical in the amount of
time needed to obtain it. This is also where the described password derivation
method shows its strengths. For once it does not use a character passphrase so
the attacker is unable to employ a dictionary attack which could dramatically
speed up the brute-force attack. The user simply cannot enter a weak password
(such as “password“). Secondly unique (per-user) cryptographic salts are used
thereby disabling pre-calculated rainbow table attacks on the SHA hash. From
this perspective the approach to store data is perfectly secure.
A smarter attacker though may choose a different way of breaking the user’s
password. Since the only dynamic part in the final password is the number gained
from the prime product part the attacker may focus only at it with a more
directed brute-force (factorization) attack. The attack would consist of trying
out all prime-index (or color if you will) combinations of the password which
for a password of the length 8 is less than 88 combinations (eight primesˆeight
color selections). Though this way assumes the attacker has in addition to the
database file itself a) knowledge of the inner workings of the password derivation
algorithm, b) the prime numbers used and c) the user’s username and his device’s
serial number, it is not to be dismissed as these information may be easy to come
by.
While the second attack vector is significantly faster than the first approach and
realizable in practice the system still provides a relatively high level of security.
It assumes extensive knowledge of the application implementation and access to
the needed data, plus for the attacker to try all password combinations which





3.21685687631872 × 1014 combinations. Meanwhile there is nothing preventing
the user to still have a simple but more effective password e.g. 5 colors with 5
clicks each (about 4.3 x 1021 combinations in total) or even more. As an added
benefit the user is prevented from entering dictionary-like passwords and the
color-based password inputting mechanism presents a small added value to the
security scheme (similar to gesture unlocks on mobile phones).
The impact of an eventual password breach on the security system would be
fatal as the database file contains all private data including the PGP private key
ring and the password to it. Even worse, such a security breach would mean not
only loss of data confidentiality but allows the attacker to impersonate the victim
as identity and message authentication is based on PGP signatures. Moreover
with a proper set-up man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks could be possible
to eavesdrop on calls because session keys for the media plane are exchanged in
PGP encrypted objects.
MITM attacks apply also to the public key exchange channels which do not
require the public key rings and contact information to be encrypted. While an
attacker might in some cases intercept these messages and exchange the keys for
forged ones the impact is next to none and requires only that the users double-
check the fingerprints of the received keys (generating a fingerprint collision for
two different OpenPGP key rings is very, very unlikely).
Using OpenPGP key rings as the central piece of the security scheme opens
also another attack vector. Should the user store (or export) his private key ring
somewhere outside of the database the attacker may try to brute-force the key
ring password. The security level in this case greatly depends on the key ring
password strength. For PGP key rings generated by the application this is not an
issue as the key ring password is essentially the same as the database password
(only additionally Base 64 encoded so the user may enter it as a textual pass-
phrase when using other PGP related software) therefore the password strength
analysis of the previous case is applicable. However the application should allow
the import of existing key rings as long as they fulfil certain requirements. The
requirements are that the key ring must contain at least two keys that are each at
least 1024 bit strong (one master signing and one encryption sub key, see 2.4.2).
This requirement is enforced in order not to weaken the security scheme with
weak imported PGP keys. The problem in this case is that no requirement on
the key ring password is set so the user can reuse his existing key ring which
he has potentially already distributed and is being trusted to by other parties.
Hence the key ring security is a responsibility of the user. Regardless of where the
responsibility lies, should such a custom imported key ring’s password be obtained
by the attacker the security impact would be almost as great as in the previous
case. While the attacker would not gain access to the database (and therefore no
stored private data including recorded calls) he still could impersonate the victim
or eavesdrop on his communications.
Eavesdropping VoIP systems is possible only by intercepting voice data packets
which in the given architecture are properly encrypted. Therefore for an attacker
to eavesdrop in the given architecture design the messages in the SIP signalling
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plane that carry the session parameters for the data exchange must be captured
first. SIP in general is substantially insecure as for example analysed in the official
U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report ([23]). Due
to its plain text nature it is unprotected and susceptible to any imaginable attack
ranging from message forgery/tampering and false SIP registrations up to loss of
data confidentiality. The NIST report suggests using TLS sockets to secure the
signalling plane which is also a first-level measure employed by the architecture.
While TLS alone should be enough to secure SIP the proposed architecture goes
a step further and adds another layer of security. The main reason is that the
attacker still has three opportunities to circumvent the encryption used on TLS
channels. For one he could use a 0-day exploit on the TLS stack to gain access
to the plain-text messages. Furthermore he could seize the SIP server instance
and use it to capture the messages since the encryption is only between the UAC
endpoint and the server. At last he could exploit a situation that prohibits the
use of TLS in favour of UDP socket for some reason (e.g. NAT traversal issues).
Concurring from these attacker’s options the architecture employs a second-level
safety measure based on PGP. This includes each SIP message being signed with a
PGP certificate so it is not modifiable without the modification not being detected
by the endpoint in which case the message is immediately thrown away by the
SIP stack. Also the cryptographic parameters for a session are encrypted with
the public keys of each participant making them practically unreadable to the
attacker. Basically the SIP stack in the architecture makes no assumptions of the
security of the SIP message transport and/or the SIP server and relies purely on
PGP for message authenticity and integrity (see 2.4.3). So even if the attacker
has managed to exploit the TLS security layer (or the SIP server) the added
security measures prevent him from modifying the SIP messages or reading the
piggy-backed symmetric session keys from the SDP message body.
It is thereof safe to say that unless the attacker has no access to the pri-
vate PGP key rings of the participants or a fundamental flaw in the OpenPGP
cryptosystem is discovered that the data confidentiality in the signalling plane is
ensured. On the other hand anonymity of the participants can be secured only if
the TLS layer is properly employed and the SIP server is secured. Otherwise the
attacker, whilst still unable to decrypt the contents of the data session, can read
the SIP messages and obtain potentially useful call “metadata“ so to speak such
as the (IP) location of the user or on when and by who a call was placed.
All the employed security measure however cannot prevent a denial of service
(DoS) attack. Should the IP address of a user (and his SIP stack) be available
to the attacker with enough network bandwidth and computing power he is able
to effectively exclude the user from any communication (even if the messages are
thrown away at once). This applies also to the SIP server which in which case
the DoS would affect all registered users. Also in case the SIP server is taken over
by an attacker he may just simply discard or redirect any received SIP message
from a given set of users. This is a general problem of network based services
and no final (endpoint) solution is known to the author. A proper DoS defensive
configuration of the SIP server may alleviate the issue a bit but only in case the
SIP DoS attack is routed through the SIP server and does not hold if the attacker
targets the user’s endpoint directly.
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The media plane uses by default at least AES-128 symmetric data encryp-
tion and message digests or HMACs for integrity checks and authenticity of the
encrypted packet data. With different (random) session keys for both directions
given a secure RNG no computational attack is plausible from this attack vector
besides the mentioned interception of the session keys. This applies also to other
symmetric algorithms eventually provided by the application and selectable by
the user at each endpoint separately. The user is simply not given the option to
choose an algorithm that is considered weak or insecure. For performance reasons
however the user might choose not to create a key secured HMAC for each RTP
packet sent but only a hash digest such as MD5. The hashes are on the receiver’s
end used to verify the data integrity of the arriving packet and in case of HMAC’s
also the authenticity of the packet’s origin (since the HMAC is created with the
session key). Although using digest hashes may increase performance and does
not affect data confidentiality it opens an attacker a window to tamper with the
integrity of the transmitted data. By a MITM attack on the local network or
the rtpproxy part of the SIP server (2.4.4) the attacker might destroy, garble or
replace the data packets and create a new digest stamp to hide the modification.
This could in addition to data loss result in buffer overflows in the applica-
tion and/or potential code injection (though probably not in Java). Thereby on
sufficiently capable hardware the HMAC option should always be used. Packet
HMACs are also a countermeasure against replay attacks from which an at-
tacker might obtain potentially useful information or simply block the user’s line.
This applies also to the signalling plane.
The last threat in this area is again a DoS attack that could prevent the users
from exchanging data.
The last section of the analysis will discuss security threats originating from
outside the architecture’s range. Attacks on the underlying operating sys-
tem belong in this classification. An attacker with sufficient OS rights (e.g. root
privileges) might easily do a memory (RAM) dump of the running application’s
memory space. Since all data from the database is in runtime loaded into the
memory a simple data analysis would reveal all confidential data including pass-
words to the attacker. The security fallout in this case is the same as in the first
analysed case where the attacker cracked the password. Note that this applies
not only to desktop systems but mobile platforms as well. For example the iOS
can be “jailbroken“ and for Android smartphones a number of privilege escala-
tion (“root“) exploits is available. In addition hardware attacks targeting the
memory physical memory modules are possible, though a great deal of expertise
is required (such as a cryogenic freeze and imminent data dump of the RAM
modules). Simpler but not less effective software and hardware hacks include
malicious keylogger software in some form that might record the user’s clicks
and input or just simply take a screenshot of the password after it has been en-
tered. In this regard the application is fully exposed to the security measures of
the underlying system and of the user administering the system. Some even more
“trivial“ attacks fall in this category such as a planted bug, eavesdropping with
a directed microphone array or plainly catching the user in the act of entering
his password.
User behaviour in general is a great security risk as a much of the system’s
45
security relies on it. Users might select relatively weak passwords (e.g. for the
imported PGP key ring) or leave the running application unattended so an at-
tacker has unlimited access to it in the user’s absence. And of course the greatest
security architecture can fail if the user writes down his password on a Stick-it
note next to the device or succumbs to a social engineering attack.
Disregarding the attacks the architecture is by principle unable to fight back,
under the conditions listed at the beginning of this analysis the security archi-
tecture provides a great deal of security on multiple levels and relies only on the
endpoints clients. The only 3rd party involved in the scheme is the SIP server
and should it be compromised the impact is limited (see SIP TLS circumvention
attacks). But even if data confidentiality in the signalling plane is ensured it is
still one of the most vulnerable points of the architecture (indifferent whether
with or without the server) as it is susceptible to DoS and user identity/loca-
tion identification attacks. The absolutely most vulnerable point is the user who
generates or imports weak passwords into the otherwise safe system.
2.6 Compatibility
To summarize, implementations of the architecture as it was proposed in the
text will be compatible between each other indifferent of the underlying platforms.
The key reasons for that are the usage of universal network protocols such as
SIP and RTP and mainly the employment of Google protocol buffers as the
data format for everything the application persists or exchanges. Programming
libraries for protocol buffers are available on a number of platforms including all
the key ones. Because of that it is possible to export the database including the
recorded call files from an Android smartphone and import it into an iPhoneTM
without any customizations on the data (which might not be possible using e.g.
native SQLite databases). The protocol buffer library even takes care of little and
big endian conversions when transferring data between platforms with a different
endianess.
Using established codecs for audio or video transfers is another key point as
they not only compress the data (in most cases) but guarantee that each platform
can decode the frames to a format it understands.
Of course deployment of custom solutions comes at a price. While the audio
codecs used (speex, G.711) are compatible to existing applications (see 2.8), the
RTP packets payloads are not as they are packaged into protocol buffer messages
which none of the applications would understand. Also the encryption algorithms
used are standardized on all platforms but no standard security mechanisms such
as ZRTP/SRTP were adopted. This is mostly due to the limited functionality
and limited variety of encryption algorithms in contrast to the requirements of
the proposed secure communicator. Another factor is that development of ZRTP
is stalled at draft stage (RFC 6189) and there are only few freely available and
stable implementations for even less platforms (the latter includes also SRTP).
However using SIP for signalling has the added benefit that most of the existing
implementations depend on it also and can be seen as the common denominator.
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So while the architecture in the current design is not compatible with existing
applications because of the mentioned reasons it could be extended with a com-
patibility mode to allow non-encrypted calls or calls using ZRTP/SRTP. The
signalling layer would then have to change only marginally by temporarily dis-
abling or modifying the authentication and key exchange mechanisms.
2.7 Android platform limitations
The prototype implementation as described in chapter 3 will be developed for
the Google Android platform for smartphones. Constrained hardware resources
such as memory and processing (CPU) performance on mobile platforms are given
by the limited space and battery life. Android is no exception to this. Prelimi-
nary benchmarks have shown that available hardware at the time of writing may
not be capable of simultaneous encrypted data transfers in satisfactory quality or
speed. The analysis therefore focused on the primary function of the secure com-
municator, which is making secure calls. This is also where the implementation’s
focus should lie.
Another limitation of Android is that the Universal Serial Bus (USB) interface
is not programmatically accessible through the platforms API at levels7 below
12 which narrows the list available channels for data exchange. Furthermore the
networking channels that are left are limited by Android’s connectivity manager8
which allows using only one channel at a time. The manager does not even allow
a manual selection between e.g. 2G/3G or wireless connection despite the fact
that they are established on distinct network adapters.
The listed concerns have been considered in the architecture proposal and
should be considered during the implementation and evaluation phase of the
final application prototype.
2.8 Related work
A lot of research already went into cryptography and secured (VoIP) communi-
cation and the thesis leverages this knowledge to build a new and safe architecture
of a secure communicator. For example Phil Zimmerman, the creator of the PGP
standards which are also used as a component of the architecture in this thesis,
tried to approach the mentioned security issues by creating the PGPfone software
and later on the ZRTP standard. His Zfone project’s software was probably the
first VoIP client that used ZRTP. The project however is now discontinued and
only a limited software development kit (SDK) can be obtained, not the software
alone. He is now actively part of the Silent Circle venture that – at the time of
writing – is planning to provide encrypted call and messaging services for mobile
devices. Silent Circle is based on Zfone and there are surprisingly only a handful
7See http://d.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/uses-sdk-element.html#
ApiLevels for explanation on Android API levels.
8Implemented by the ConnectivityManager class as defined in http://d.android.com/
reference/android/net/ConnectivityManager.html
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of other implemented secure VoIP solutions that do exist for mobile platforms.
The vast majority of them use TLS sockets to secure the SIP signalling layer
and/or ZRTP/SRTP standards to secure the media plane. This approach being
a standard has its advantages, but is has also drawbacks as pointed out in sec-
tion 2.6. As an example CSipSimple has to be named as the only open-source
(GPL) solution with these parameters. Proprietary solutions include the iCall
software exclusively for the iOS platform or Bria that is also available for An-
droid and others. The popular Skype software offers call encryption, however it
is suspected that calls made through it can be monitored by government agencies
(taken from e.g. [24]).
In comparison the number of desktop VoIP clients or clients that use no data
encryption is greatly larger, e.g. SipDroid or Viber to name a few. A clearly
arranged table with an overview of all related software products may be found
at [25].
The proposed architecture tries to walk down a different path than the listed




The prototype implementation of the architecture as described in the previ-
ous chapters is designated for the Google Android platform to see whether the
approach is viable on one of the currently leading mobile platforms. The goal is
to show that it is well possible to build such a communicator application that is
as secure as it is usable on current smartphones. This chapter gives insight into
the application structure from a software development point of view beginning
with the project source codes structure in section 3.1. The major components as
pointed out in chapter 2 are described accordingly in subsections of section 3.2.
If not explicitly stated otherwise the implementation of the components sticks
straightforwardly to the design in the analytical part of the thesis. As a detailed
description of the source code would yield no added value for this thesis the text
focuses on the general features of the implementation. If needed, implementation
details can be reviewed in the program documentation or directly in the source
code of the application. Both are to be found in the appendices section together
with a short user manual (Appendix C).
Implementation specific security issues are discussed in section 3.3. The last
section 3.4 contains instructions on how to test and build the application (al-
though a binary build is present on the attached CD-ROM). A final evaluation
on the capabilities and eventual shortcomings of the prototype is given in the
final chapter 4.
3.1 Project and package organization
The secure communicator application has been nicknamed with the working
title “CryptDroid“ and given a logo (Figure 3.1) along with an internet domain
(cryptdroid.net). The domain is used for aliasing the IP address of the SIP server
and SIP account registrations. From now on the application prototype may be
referred to simply as CryptDroid.
Figure 3.1: CryptDroid project logo
CryptDroid was developed using the Eclipse integrated development environ-
ment (IDE) with the Android Development Tools (ADT, see [26] and [27]) plug-
in installed. The application itself is composed of three separate Eclipse Java
projects which mimic the basic layout of the architecture and three supporting
projects. The application’s projects are as follows:
1. cryptdroid 3rdparty lib – Stores the used 3rd party libraries as well as
the compiled .jar file of the SIP library from the cryptdroid sip project. See
3.1.1.
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2. cryptdroid base – Contains the java com.cryptdroid.base package with
the core logic of the application. The package source files contain no direct
references to Android classes or interfaces and form therefore the base mod-
ule that may be reused in implementations for other platforms that support
Java (e.g. a desktop PC version). It also contains the com.cryptdroid.-
android java package with the Android platform specific implementation of
HAL and some of the logic components (controllers). Additional 3rd party
libraries that are distributed in the form of Java source files and need to be
compiled are also packaged in this project.
3. cryptdroid ui – This is the main project that depends on the previous two
and on the Android software development kit (SDK). The Eclipse project
has the Android project trait which allows it to contain the individual
screens of the graphical interface (Android activities) of the application.
The Activities are placed in the com.cryptdroid.ui package. The project
is also used to build the final binary distributable (Android .apk file) as
described in section 3.4.
The three supporting projects are not compiled into the final distributable and
host supplementary data:
1. cryptdroid sip – A Java project containing the refactored source files of
the JAIN SIP library (see 3.2.4). An Ant build script is included to build
the JAR library file which is then placed into the cryptdroid 3rdparty lib
project.
2. cryptdroid test – Test project with the jUnit test source files.
3. cryptdroid doc – Strictly speaking this is not a project but only a folder
with the OpenSIPS configuration files, program documentation (JavaDoc)
and a digital copy of the thesis’ text.
3.1.1 Used libraries
In cases where the application uses well known algorithms and/or approaches
it would be inefficient of it to not to reuse existing code in form of libraries.
Such an area is for example logging or code testing frameworks. On the other
hand some libraries (e.g. JAIN SIP and Google protocol buffers) are needed
to implement the functionality set by the architecture. Table 3.1 provides a
comprehensive overview of all used libraries in the CryptDroid application.
Since the Android framework already contains parts of some of the libraries
two libraries had to be renamed (refactored) in order to not cause Java dupli-
cate class name conflicts when they are to be included into the application. The
first library is the widely used Bouncy Castle Java security provider library1 that
contains implementations of all cryptographic algorithms used in the application
as well as PGP. The Android framework uses parts of this library itself there-
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Table 3.1: Used 3rd party libraries
Castle with the exception of the package name (org.spongycastle instead of
org.bouncycastle) and the provider name (“SC“ instead of “BC“).
The second library is the JAIN SIP library3 which Android includes from
version 2.3 upwards (API level 9). Since the application targets API level 7
(Android 2.1) the library has to be included but without causing conflicts on
newer Android versions. The cryptdroid sip project solves this by refactoring a
copy of the library checked out from a Subversion (SVN) server of the original
JAIN SIP project. It prepends a “com.cryptdroid“ prefix to all package names




3.2 Implementation specifics of components
3.2.1 The Events and services system
The events system as explained in subsection 2.2.1 is implemented one to
one to the specified design by the application’s com.cryptdroid.base.events
package. The EventHandler is a singleton class responsible for receiving and dis-
tributing events to registered listeners. Events are created in the EventFactory.
Static controllers and the event types they want to listen to are registered by the
StartupManager class which is called by the BackendService class on application
start-up.
The BackendService is an implementation of the Android’s Service class
and thereof must have been placed in the cryptdroid ui project. It represents the
heart of the application in the sense that this is main entry point of the Crypt-
Droid application. This service is present for the whole lifetime of the application
and basically holds all event listeners from the logic layer. The controller instances
could not have been placed into an Android activity since the Android operating
system may kill Activity classes almost at will (e.g. to save battery life or free up
memory) which in turn would remove all references to the controllers from mem-
ory. Such an effect is not desirable since the controllers need to be always present
to receive events (such as incoming calls) even when the application is not active
on the user’s screen. This distinction into services and activities is important in
Android since activities are only short-lived screens (objects) while services are
the only classes guaranteed not to be killed by the OS. Therefore placing the logic
layer into a service is only a consequence to the given restrictions of the underly-
ing operating system. Aside from the main effect of the application being able to
run in background the service also cleanly separates the presentational layer (the
activities) and the logic layer (the controllers) by acting as a middleman between
them. The activities can access the service through their own instance of the
PresentationHandler class. The PresentationHandler class is a helper class
that automatically connects the activity to the service and registers the activity
as a runtime event listener (if case the activity wants to receive some events). On
the other hand when the activity is destroyed it de-registers it from the service
and the event handler.
The BackendService object has one additional responsibility which is to in-
form the application when the network channels or connectivity changes. By
listening to native Android events it detects changes in the network configuration
such as when the user switches from a mobile network (e.g. 3G) to a wireless
one or connects to a network the first time. This is usually accompanied by a
temporary network connection loss and by obtaining a new IP address. These
situations are signaled to the application with the NET CONNECTION LOST
or NET CONNECTION ESTABLISHED events respectively so it can take ap-
propriate measures (such as reloading the SIP stack with the newly acquired IP
address). All event types are defined in the EventTypeEnum enumeration Java
object and summarized in Table A.1 (p.77).
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3.2.2 Hardware abstraction
Hardware abstraction classes representing underlying devices and services
(see 2.2.2) are placed in the com.cryptdroid.android.hal package together
with a factory (HALAndroidImpl class) for creating these objects. Since the
com.cryptdroid.base package should not reference directly any objects from
the Android SDK and the HAL system should be generic for multiple plat-
forms only the HAL interfaces and a proxy HAL factory (HAL class) from the
com.cryptdroid.base.hal package are used in the logic layer. The abstraction
was done only for services needed in the core logic. See the program documenta-
tion on the HAL package for details on which services these are.
The android specific package in the cryptdroid base project contains not only
HAL specific implementations but also a com.cryptdroid.android.controllers
package for controllers that are specific to the Android platform. It is designed in
first place to hold controllers that make sense only on Android. Controllers that
require a direct access to the platform’s API due to the way how the Android
platform handles the application’s resources and would be cumbersome to write
using only HAL interfaces may also be placed here. For now only the controller
handling call ringtones is located here (RingtonesSingletonController).
3.2.3 Cryptography and CryptoBoxes
The application security scheme heavily relies on the usage of cryptographic
algorithms as described in section 2.5. In the logic layer they are used through the
standardized javax.crypto.* a java.security.* Java interface packages. The
implementation used is provided by the refactored Bouncy Castle library Java
cryptography provider Spongy Castle which also provides an OpenPGP (RFC
4880) implementation. All programmatic access to these packages is however
wrapped around with custom classes in the com.cryptdroid.base.crypto pack-
age to prevent misconfiguration and unnecessary boilerplate code. The package
main classes are CryptoBoxSymmetric, CryptoBoxFactory and CryptoBoxSpec
where CryptoBox is an acronym for a cryptographic black box object. This means
that once a CryptoBox object is configured it can be used as a “black box“ to en-
crypt, decrypt or hash data without the respective code worrying too much about
the inside mechanisms of it. The configuration is created and stored in immutable
CryptoBoxSpec objects which are then passed to the CryptoBoxFactory. The
factory checks the validity of the configuration and if it was correct returns a fully
configured CryptoBox object. If not it throws an exception. For now only Cryp-
toBoxes for symmetric algorithms are implemented (CryptoBoxSymmetric) and
its derivations with Digest or HMAC algorithms (CryptoBoxSymmetricDigest
or CryptoBoxSymmetricHMAC).
A configuration is created by providing parameters to the CryptoBoxSpec ob-
ject constructors. All parameters are enumeration objects from the com.crypt-
droid.base.crypto.algorithms package which contain all supported crypto-
graphic algorithms, padding and block modes, key sizes and hash digest and
HMAC algorithms. CryptoBoxSpec objects can be also created in the factory by
calling the helper methods getCryptoBoxSpecsFromPreferences() and adapt-
CryptoBoxSpecsFromSipAttachment(). As their names already give away the
first method creates specs based on the user’s preferences whereas the latter bases
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the specification on the parameters received from a remote user to whom a SIP
voice call is being established. The created CryptoBox objects are immutable
and provide an easy but flexible way to handle the required cryptographic tasks
related to symmetric cryptography and hashing.
Asymmetric cryptography is used only in PGP related tasks such as identity
verification of the remote party and transferring session keys (see 2.4.2). Due to
their separate nature PGP classes have an own com.cryptdroid.base.crypto.-
pgp package but the base principle of wrapping the access to the underlying classes
stays the same. The PGP class provides methods for encrypting and decrypting
data and handles PGP signatures as well.
Another important class is located in the com.cryptdroid.base.crypto pack-
age and that is the Primes class. It holds the Mersenne prime numbers #12 to
#19 used in the authentication scheme as requested in section 2.3 and provides
methods to retrieve or store a prime to index mapping.
3.2.4 The SIP stack and OpenSIPS
The SIP related logic used in the prototype is built in top of the JAIN SIP
library. The JAIN SIP reference implementation according to [15] is a public
domain product of the Advanced Networking Technologies Division at the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, an agency of the United
States Department of Commerce). It is the de-facto standard library for many
SIP applications and was in a refactored form (see 3.1.1) chosen as the SIP stack
for CryptDroid. A drawback of the library is that it was not possible to develop a
properly functioning prototype communicating a SIP session through TCP/TLS
sockets. While TLS is officially supported in JAIN SIP the library code execution
mostly failed with an exception. Additionally NAT traversal using TURN was
not possible when using TLS though it was properly configured for UDP. As this
would hinder all incoming communication from the SIP server it was decided to
use the less secure UDP sockets for all SIP messaging. The negative security
impact of this solutions is thanks to the communicator security scheme limited
as discussed in section 2.5.
The SIP stack implementation in the application is formed mainly by three
classes that have their home in the com.cryptdroid.base.sip package (with
the exception of the controller). The stack configuration is held by the SipCfg
class which includes static properties (such as the transport protocol used) and
dynamic properties like the SIP account name and password to register with
on the SIP registrar server. The configuration file is passed to a newly created
SipStackListener object the first time a SIP INIT or every time a SIP RESET
event is received by the SipSingletonController. The controller is responsi-
ble for managing the SIP stack instance and translating CryptDroid events to
SIP events (messages). SipStackListener is the actual SIP message proces-
sor responsible for handling SIP requests and responses and translating them
back into CryptDroid type events. To listen to SIP events it implements the
JAIN-SIP SipListener interface and to send the application’s events it holds a
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reference to a SipStackCallback interface which is conveniently implemented by
SipSingletonController that thereby closes the event loop.
Note that the SIP stack is also reloaded each time a NET CONNECTION -
ESTABLISHED event is received in order to update the stack and the registration
entry on the registrar with the newly acquired IP address.
Because the application cannot be used meaningfully without a SIP account a
SSL secured website at https://www.cryptdroid.net/register/ has been set
up to facilitate SIP account registrations. The user is notified about that fact in
the initial set-up phase of the application and must configure an account before
he may proceed. The registration website is fairly simple and contains only one
form for entering the desired username and password. After submitting the form
a SIP account is created in the OpenSIPS server’s database.
The mentioned domain name aliases a virtual machine hosting not only the
website but also the OpenSIPS and rtpproxy applications. OpenSIPS serves as
the registrar and proxy according to the architecture requirements as specified in
subsection 2.4.3. All configuration files needed to set up the applications may be
found in the cryptdroid doc/conf directory on the attached CD-ROM.
3.2.5 Calls
Voice calls are the most critical feature of the secure communicator not only
from the user’s point of view but also regarding the number of processes involved.
Once a call is established and signalized to the CallSingletonController lis-
tener it fires up five processes. They divide the necessary responsibilities be-
longing to a voice call ranging from audio recording on the sending site to audio
playback on the receiving side as they were specified in subsection 2.4.4. Figure
3.2 depicts these processes in a one way audio stream situation from the caller
to the callee. Of course in the implementation both ends have to mirror the de-
picted situation in order to send and receive audio data at the same time therefore
running all five processes in parallel.
Figure 3.2: Call processes
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In the shown situation the call is already established and the RTP proxy has
been appropriately configured by the SIP server to forward all RTP packets from
the caller to the callee to circumvent symmetric NAT devices. Full arrows rep-
resent the packet payload (recorded audio frames wrapped into an encrypted
protocol buffer message) whereas dotted arrows represent whole RTP datagram
packets. Dotted lines on the other separate processes so each dotted box repre-
sents a single thread.
The path of an audio sample carrying the recorded voice begins in the Audio-
RecorderService which is implemented by the AudioPlaybackServiceAndroid-
Impl HAL object. It records raw (WAV) audio samples and encodes them with
an audio codec depending on the user’s preferences. For performance reasons
codec implementations use native (C/C++) code called through a Java native
interface (JNI) wrapper for. The codec implementations are borrowed from the
SipDroid project4 and the corresponding wrappers are hence located in the org.-
sipdroid.codecs Java package. Implemented codecs include speex, the G.711
a-law/µ-law variants, G.722 and the standard GSM codec as it is used in voice
calls over the classic GSM network.
After a sample has been encoded it is sent to a callback reference of the
AudioRecorderReadCallback interface type. The callback is implemented by
the CallDataOutgoingService which queues the recorded frames into a buffer
(blocking queue). The service is a separate thread that takes multiple frames from
the buffer, wraps them into the RtpPacketPayload message which it in turn
encrypts in a pre-configured CrytpoBox based again on the user’s preferences
(see Table B.1, p.78). The encrypted bytes form the payload of a new RTP
packet which is then send over the network through the RTP proxy to the callee.
This producer-consumer scheme continues until all processes are tore down by
the CallSingletonController after a CALL END or CALL ERROR event is
received.
On the receiving side the sending process is mirrored. For receiving (but also
sending) RTP packets the jlibrtp library is used (org.jlibrtp package) which
spawns its own receiver thread. A consumer for that receiving thread is imple-
mented by the CallDataIncomingService. Analogue to the outgoing service
it buffers the incoming packets and a thread polls them from the buffer. Once
the packet payload is decrypted it is split back into audio frames (still encoded).
The frames are passed to the AudioPlaybackService’s additional audio buffer
to prevent a stuttering sound. Once the playback thread registers frames in the
buffer it decodes them back to pulse code modulated (PCM) samples and sends
them to the Android speaker hardware API.
Note that all classes and interfaces beginning with “Call“ are located in the
com.cryptdroid.base.controllers.call package. This package includes be-
sides the formerly mentioned services and controllers another two controllers.
One is responsible for keeping track of the call history (CallHistorySingleton-
Controller) by listening to all call related events and creating and saving the
according database entries as described in subsection 2.2.4. The other one is the
4https://code.google.com/p/sipdroid/
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CallRecordingSingletonController. When activated it taps into the incom-
ing and outgoing data services from where it obtains copies (clones) of the RTP
packet payloads before they have been decrypted. The signal is an event triggered
by pressing the call recording button on the call screen. These packet copies are
stored on the external storage while the metadata (session keys etc.) is kept in
the database for playback purposes. The according protocol buffer messages are
stored in the cryptdroid base/src-proto folder.
3.2.6 Database
The database according to the scheme in Figure 2.3 is modelled by multiple
hash maps, lists and protocol buffer objects kept in the UserDB object. Once the
database is loaded it resides only in memory and is written to disk only for persis-
tence. Because it would have no sense at this time to have multiple databases the
UserDB object is a singleton where all its public methods are synchronized. The
synchronized method access ensures data integrity and atomicity of database op-
erations. Before the public methods may be called the database has to be loaded
(or created) otherwise they throw a DatabaseNotOpenException exception. For
a full database API specification please refer to the JavaDoc program documen-
tation. Since the database is part of the authentication scheme it is held in
the com.cryptdroid.base.controllers.security package. Methods for cre-
ating, opening and saving the database are package private and can be called
only from the UserAuthenticationSingletonController which resides in the
same package and listens to authentication and database events. These events
include the SECURITY USER FIRST SETUP event for the initial creation of
the database file, the password and a random prime-index mapping. The event
is sent only once in the whole application lifetime and that is after the initial
application setup. Further events are SECURITY USER AUTH which are sent
from the login screen each time the user has entered his password (prime-index
combination) and wants to log in. In both cases the response events are either
SECURITY USER AUTH OK or SECURITY USER AUTH FAILED, depend-
ing on whether the database loading/creation was successful or not. Once created
the database is loaded on succeeding runs by a SECURITY USER AUTH event
with the entered credentials as the parameter.
The database is persisted to the internal storage on two occasions. The first
is after receiving a SYSTEM EXIT event which not only creates the database
structure file and saves it to disk but also clears all database related variables and
references. The second occasion is the reception of a SYSTEM PERSIST DATA
event which saves the data to disk but does not unload the database from memory.
To prevent data loss on application crashes or forced shut-downs by the operating
system the event is sent after the user leaves the main screen or a significant data
change took place (such as adding a contact). To save battery life it is not sent
periodically because encryption is quite demanding on computational power.
Created database files may be exported from the application based on a user
request from the GUI. The file is saved on an external storage device so it can be
imported later after a data application wipe or on another device.
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3.2.7 Graphical user interface (GUI)
The main project cryptdroid ui is an Android type Eclipse project and con-
tains all the activities (screens) and media resources of the application. As ex-
plained in subsection 3.2.1 the CryptDroid front end activities are connected
through a PresentationHandler proxy object to the back end part. The back
end (cryptdroid base project) handles the application’s logic and is stored in the
BackendService object. When the service is running an icon and a persistent
notification is shown in the Android status bar.
The screens itself are written directly to the Android platform API in order to
fully utilize the framework’s capabilities. In addition the code makes heavy use of
the androidannotations library that removes a noticeable amount of boilerplate
code. All activities and services are placed in the com.crytpdroid.ui package. A
short description of technical features of each activity follows (see also Figure 3.3).
For a short user guide please refer to Appendix C on page 79.
SetupActivity is the first screen the user sees after a fresh installation of
CryptDroid. It contains seven sub-screens with instructions on how to properly
set up the application including the SIP account, the PGP keyring and the color
based password. After every field is correctly filled it sends the values as a param-
eter of the SECURITY USER FIRST SETUP event to initialize the database. If
the initialization succeeds the user is redirected to the home screen activity.
The other option to initialize a database is to import it from a previously
exported database file. In this case a separate DbImportActivity is launched
which guides the user through the process. Because the IMEI number of the de-
vice the original database was created is part of the salt of the database password
the user must know and enter it.
LoginActivity is the first screen the user sees on each consecutive login. It
serves only for entering the password and username. The username field is pre-
filled and can be modified only if the username could not be read from application
local preferences. The color buttons are randomly placed in two rows and their
index value is read from the stored prime index mapping. After the credentials
have been entered a SECURITY USER AUTH event is sent. On success the
database is loaded, the client registers itself at the SIP server and redirects the
user to the home screen (HomeActivity).
HomeActivity is the main screen of the application. From here the all func-
tions of the communicator can be reached. It is divided into three tabs where the
first contains a list of contacts, the second a call history and the final tab with
the (editable) details of the currently logged in user. On the first two screens a
name filter is available that filters the lists for a given name (or starting part of a
name). When a hash sign (“#“) is entered into the filtering box an auto-complete
menu shows available “tags“ (filters) to filter out entries based on various criteria
e.g. the trustworthiness of a contact or the date when a call was made.
Pressing the menu button gives more options such as sharing the user’s contact
information (together with the public PGP key ring), getting to the preference
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Figure 3.3: Application screens (From left: The login, home and in-call activities)
screen or exiting the application.
When selecting a contact or a call history item in the first or second screen a
pop-up menu is shown with available actions. This serves mainly for establishing
a voice call or short-cuts for emailing or sending a SMS. Selecting the call button
sends triggers a CALL START event which effectively results into sending a SIP
invite request to the selected remote party.
ContactActivity is launched after a contact is selected for editing or adding.
From there a new contact entity can either be created or imported. The im-
plemented contact imports and exports include a file based variant where the
contact file (.cdc) is stored on the device’s storage or sent directly by email. A
second variant uses QR codes that can be scanned by a 3rd party software named
Barcode Scanner. The scan result must be a Base 64 encoded prototype buffer
Contact entity (Listing 2.4).
PGP key rings may be also updated here on existing contacts to address key
revocation or expiration issues.
CallActivity is a simple activity presented to the user while in-call and pro-
vides controls for accepting, ending or recording a call in progress.
PreferencesActivity is a standard Android layout preference screen that al-
lows the user to set his preferences including SIP account credentials or audio
and voice data encryption settings. Since Android provides an own preferences
framework the shared and local type preferences as defined in Table B.1, (p.78)
are copied to the Android implementation (SharedPreferences class). After
editing the preference changes are persisted back to the database. The HAL
interface AppLocalPreferences is responsible just for that.
The DbExportActivity may be started from this screen in order to export
the current database in memory to an external file. The activity shows the user
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the IMEI number of the device used as the database password salt so the user
can import it on a different device with a different IMEI number.
3.3 Implementation specific security issues
This chapter is an extension of the original security analysis (2.5) taking into
account specifics of the implementation and the Android OS. It will not deal
with the concepts of Android security per-se as these are sufficiently handled in
available publications ([28], [29]).
In general the greatest risk on Android systems is that applications may ex-
ploit vulnerabilities to gain root access (privilege escalation)5. Eventually some
user’s root their phones on purpose making these attacks even easier. A mali-
cious application can then break out of its sandbox and access memory segments,
preferences and files belonging to other applications (such as CryptDroid). The
impact of this is fatal and was discussed in the original security analysis. Should
it however have access only to the database file which is normally stored in the
private application segment of the internal storage the attack is void as the file
is properly encrypted and signed.
Access to the user’s preferences (that are cloned to the Android preferences
system only at runtime though) has a limited impact as the preferences (as listed
in Table B.1, p.78) do not contain fatally sensitive information except the SIP
account credentials. It is imaginable that the attacker changes the preferences
(and the user might not even notice) to open a window for a different kind of
attack e.g. by selecting a digest algorithm over a HMAC one for data integrity
checks or a weaker encryption algorithm.
The biggest drawback of the implementation however is that for various reasons
(see 3.2.4) TLS could not be used in the signalling plane with all the described
negative effects this concludes. This does not necessarily mean the application
is insecure as (voice) data confidentiality is untouched by this. A critical part of
the whole solution, the secure random number generator (RNG) is taken from
the Android implementation of SecureRandom. It employs the SHA1PRNG algo-
rithm and is seeded from /dev/urandom. According to the documentation “[the]
seed is unpredictable and appropriate for secure use“6.
3.4 Building and testing the application
While this thesis comes with a pre-packaged binary build of the prototype
application stored on the attached CD-ROM (see Appendix D, p.83) it is possible
to build CryptDroid from source. The preferred way is to import all projects into
Eclipse and use the IDE to compile and export the application’s APK file. An
Ant build.xml script is included for building, testing and generating JavaDoc




documentation from the command line. For that at least Ant version 1.8.2 is
required (obtainable from http://ant.apache.org).
Prerequisite for both ways is the installation of the newest (revision 20.0.1)
Android SDK found at http://developer.android.com/sdk/. Please follow
the instructions on the website on how to install it. The installation directory
of choice will be referred to as $INST DIR. Once set up the SDK development
packages must be downloaded separately by running the SDK manager applica-
tion7. At least the “Android SDK Platform-tools“ and API level 16 (Android 4.1,
the target level) packages must be selected and installed before proceeding. Fur-
ther the binaries located in the $INST DIR/tools and $INST DIR/platform-tools
folders must be in the respective PATH variables of the given operating system.
After setting up the required tools the build process is fairly straightforward.
Copy all cryptdroid * folders from the attached CD-ROM to a directory on the
system’s harddrive and enter cryptdroid ui (the main project) from the command
line. Before running the Ant script modify the local.properties file’s sdk.dir
value to point to the SDK installation directory ($INST DIR). The script is now
ready to be run and by typing ‘ant -p‘ or simply ‘ant‘ in a shell (still in the
cryptdroid ui directory) all available ant tasks will be presented. Main tasks
include:
• test – Runs the jUnit tests of the cryptdroid test project.
• doc – Generates JavaDoc into the cryptdroid doc/javadoc directory.
• debug – Compiles and builds a debug version of the APK installation file
into the cryptdroid ui/bin directory.
• release – Compiles and builds a (unsigned) release version.
• installd or installr – Installs the built APK file onto a connected Android
mobile device or a running emulator. On hardware devices the software
debugging mode must be enabled for this.
Please refer to the short user manual in Appendix C (p.79) for instructions




The secure communicator architecture was successfully ported in form of a pro-
totype application on the Google Android platform. It is capable of establishing
secured and authenticated VoiP/SIP calls through all types of NAT devices and
set-ups. In addition it has been tested under real-world conditions on multiple
devices which are:
• HTC Desire – 576MB RAM, 1GHz ARM Scorpion CPU, Android 2.2,
• LG P500 – 512 MBRAM, 600MHz ARM 11 CPU, Android 2.3,
• Sony Xperia Mini – 512MB RAM, 1GHz ARM Scorpion CPU, Android 2.3.
To display the in-call performance of the application under real-world condi-
tions in the thesis text a benchmark was performed using the first two devices in
the list. By recording the calls with the built-in recording functionality enough
data could be collected to measure the packet jitter and the time to process a
single RTP packet (with a payload as defined in 2.4.4). Figure 3.4 shows the
results of this benchmark. The jitter values in the table indicate the difference
in time between arrivals of two related RTP packets. Negative jitter values were
not considered since they do not induce lags and the average value would be
zero. The processing values for outgoing packets (“OUT“) are measured from
the point of where the process starts to create an RTP packet until the moment
it is sent. It thereby represents the time needed to pack and encrypt the recorded
audio frames and – if selected – to sign them. Values for processing incoming
(“IN“) packets measure the reversed process. However this process is, by design,
slower as packets are buffered on arrival and the measurement ends only after the
packet’s raw audio samples have been submitted to the underlying audio playback
device.
For every measurement type the minimum, average and maximum value is
always obtained over an approximately 120 seconds interval (or about 400 RTP
packets in each direction, the call duration) using a wireless network. The wire-
less network router itself was attached to a VDSL2 (16Mbit down/1Mbit up)
line. Files related to the benchmark are stored on the attached CD-ROM in the
cryptdroid test/testFS directory.
An interpretation of the results is that by considering the most important
jitter value on average the application performs well. The standard jitter value
is usually indicated at 30 ms for VoIP calls without distortions and artefacts.
The application performs on the given network with an average jitter of about
15 ms. However due to network congestion and unstable latency times the jitter
may on occasion reach up to an average of 110 ms, individually even over 150
ms. If the incoming packet buffer is not refilled in time this might be noticeable
to the user as silence or voice stutter. Also noticeable is that while using the
more computationally demanding HMACs for data verification does in general
affect the average jitter value (to the worse), the impact in absolute numbers is
relatively low as shown by the Processing OUT average values.
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Figure 3.4: Application benchmark. All values are in milliseconds (ms).
The measured jitter may also have another cause than the changing network
performance. Looking at the values for processing outgoing packets it is obvious
that normally the process is fast (about 4 – 8 ms in average) but the peak (max.)
values are very high, especially on the HTC device. Of course a delayed outgoing
packet introduces jitter on the receiver’s side. Such a behaviour has two reasons.
For once the five threads (see subsection 3.2.5) responsible for call functionality
utilize already 100% of the available CPU time so it is only normal that some-
times the sending thread is halted and must wait. This applies also to garbage
collection runs on the Dalvik virtual machine (VM), the Android counterpart of
the Oracle/Sun JVM. What might be surprising on the other hand is that the
about 40% slower LG device performs in this category almost always better com-
pared to the faster HTC device. This fact is explained simply by the difference in
the Android OS versions where the LG device uses version 2.3.3 (compared to 2.2
on the HTC device) which introduces a new and significantly faster concurrent
garbage collector8.
The results thereby correlate to the in-person experience when using the appli-
cation and conclude that it is usable even in spite of occasional artefacts or packet
loss. This is however common to all VoIP applications and not the prototype only.
While the test were executed over a wireless 802.11g network the application is
able of using also 2G/3G mobile data networks as channels for data exchange. It
automatically adapts to transitions between the underlying networks indifferent
of their type. However due to the inner workings of current network protocols as
soon as the IP address of the device changes the data exchange is interrupted.
This could be solved in the future by using mobility IPv6 addresses/networks
once they become publicly available. The mentioned channels can be used also
8http://developer.android.com/about/versions/android-2.3-highlights.html
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for public key exchange and since the defined data format is versatile an additional
way to exchange the keys using QR codes was implemented.
Remaining considerations in this evaluation are that while the architecture
proposes other types of data transfers, due to the limitations of available hardware
the implementation legitimately focuses on voice calls only which on their self
already utilize the full computing power available on the tested phones. This was
a known limitation also pointed out in the analysis (2.7).
The most pressing issue is therefore the absence of the secured (TLS) transfer
of SIP signalling messages which should be definitely addressed in the future
according to the requirements of the analysis even though the negative security
fallout is limited as analysed in section 2.5.
Also, while call quality was not the primary issue of the thesis nor the pro-
totype implementation, the sensitive microphones produce an acoustic feedback
loop which may impact the audio quality negatively. This also concludes the
evaluation as of except the issues mentioned in the last paragraphs the prototype
implementation delivers what was required by the architectural design.
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4. Conclusion
This chapter completes the thesis by a short evaluation on the fulfilment of
goals as they were defined in section 1.1 and gives an outlook in possible future
enhancements.
In compliance with the first goal the thesis proposes in chapter 2 a secure archi-
tecture and analyses the available channels and means to do so. The architecture
is well described and the event-based component system used has specified inter-
faces described by events or platform-independent messages. A security analysis
was conducted in section 2.5 and thereof in the eyes of the author the analytical
part of the thesis has been fulfilled. This applies also to the implementation re-
lated (second) goal as the final application is properly implemented to conduct
secure VoIP calls. The prototype is ready to be installed on every Android de-
vice with version 2.1 upwards from a package found on the attached CD-ROM
(Appendix D, p.83).
The last goal, the evaluation of the prototype, was done in an examination in
section 3.5 with the result that despite some technical issues (e.g. the lack of use
of TLS sockets in the signalling plane) it successfully followed the pattern set by
the architecture and has proven its viability in real-world tests. The limitations
of the prototype as well as of the architecture were properly analysed and listed.
To summarize, the thesis tried to tackle the problem of securing data and media
transmissions by providing an architectural proposition of a secure communicator
that can be implemented not only on current mobile platforms but in general as
well. By that it (and the application) differs from most currently implemented
security solutions for mobile devices which focus on one device or platform only.
Compared to them, as also outlined in sections 2.6 and 2.8, it uses a greater variety
of cryptographic algorithms and provides authentication mechanisms based on
OpenGPG signatures.
4.1 Summary and future work
All in all it was established that all main goals of the thesis were fulfilled and
that the proposed architecture is applicable for being implemented and deployed
on real-world hardware and environment. There, even on mid-range mobile de-
vices, it is capable of delivering acceptable results. And though the application is
only a prototype it is already usable for secure VoIP call including authentication
verification. Still, there is some work ahead to be done in order the application
to reach industrial grade quality.
Foremost the weakest point of the application as of now is that TLS sockets
could not be implemented. While this is no way fatal, to complete the security
scheme as designated the issue in the JAIN-SIP stack should be investigated.
If that should not be possible the whole SIP library part should be exchanged,
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which given to the few real alternatives may result in using a different signalling
protocol at all.
Further future enhancements may include optimizing the architecture and
its security related parts by e.g. an independent third party evaluation (some-
times also referred to as a “hacking contest“) to discover (and fix) new attack
vectors. On the implementation side of things a compatibility layer to existing
ZRTP/SRTP communicator solutions and commercial VoIP/SIP providers (such
as 802.cz) could widen the eventual user base. Also the architecture should be
deployed and tested on other platforms.
From the user’s perspective it may be desirable to address the somewhat an-
noying acoustic feedback issue with an echo cancellation method. Along with
the growing computational power of smartphones continuously adding concur-
rent features such as secured messaging and video calls is thinkable. For some
less-experienced users cosmetic changes to the GUI may provide a greater user
experience and by potentially fully abstracting the security scheme (especially the
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List of Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard. A specification for the symmetric
encryption of electronic data adopted by the U.S. government and
later on also worldwide.
API Application Programming Interface. Provides the means to take ad-
vantage of software features, allowing dissimilar software products to
interact upon one another.
CBC Cipher Block Chaining. A cryptographic block cipher mode that
provides confidentiality but not message integrity.
CORBA The Common Object Request Broker Architecture is a standard de-
fined by the Object Management Group (OMG) that enables soft-
ware components written in multiple computer languages and run-
ning on multiple computers to work together.
CRUD Create-Read-Update-Delete, the four basic operations on computer
data storages.
D-H Diffie–Hellman key exchange algorithm is the most widely used public
key distribution system.
E-R Entity – Relationship model/diagram is an abstract way to describe
a database.
GPB Google Protocol Buffers are a method of serializing structured data
developed by Google Inc.
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications, originally Groupe Spécial
Mobile, is a standard developed by the European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (ETSI) to describe technologies for second
generation (2G) digital cellular networks.
GUI A graphical User Interface is a type of user interface that allows
users to interact with electronic devices using images rather than
text commands.
HMAC A key-dependent one-way hash function specifically intended for use
with MAC (Message Authentication Code). Based upon RFC 2104.
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol is a common protocol used to transfer
documents between servers or from a server to a client.
IDE Integrated development environment, a software application that pro-
vides comprehensive facilities to computer programmers for software
development.
IDL Interface description language, any computer language used to de-
scribe a software component’s interface.
72
IMEI The International Mobile Equipment Identity is a unique number to
identify mobile phones.
JNI The Java Native Interface (JNI) is a programming framework that
enables Java code running in a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to call
native applications and libraries written in other languages such as
C or assembly.
MITM The man-in-the-middle attack in cryptography and computer secu-
rity is a form of active eavesdropping in which the attacker makes
independent connections with the victims and relays messages be-
tween them, making them believe that they are talking directly to
each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conver-
sation is controlled by the attacker.
NAT Network Address Translator defined in RFC 1631. A router connect-
ing two networks together; one designated as inside, is addressed with
either private or obsolete addresses that need to be converted into
legal addresses before packets are forwarded onto the other network
(designated as outside).
NDK Native Development Kit, an Android SDK for developing directly on
a computing platform rather than the virtual machine.
NFC Near Field Communication, a wireless communication technology.
NIST The National Institute of Standards and Technology. A division of
the U.S. Dept. of Commerce that publishes open, interoperability
standards called FIPS.
OpenPGP OpenPGP is a protocol for encrypting data using public key cryp-
tography as defined in RFC 4880.
PGP Pretty Good Privacy. An application and protocol (RFC 1991) for
secure e-mail and file encryption developed by Phil R. Zimmermann.
PIN Personal Identification Number. A password used to access an auto-
mated teller machine or other secured systems.
PKCS PKCS is a group of public-key cryptography standards devised and
published by RSA Security Inc.
PKI Public Key Infrastructure. A widely available and accessible certifi-
cate system for obtaining an entity’s public key with some degree of
certainty of having the right key and that it has not been revoked.
RDBMS Relational Database Management System. A system in which data is
stored in tables and the relationships among the data are also stored
in tables.
RFC Request for Comment. IETF documents that specify Internet stan-
dards. Each RFC has an RFC number by which it is indexed and by
which it can be retrieved from http://www.ietf.org.
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RNG Random Number Generator. A computational or physical device
designed to generate a sequence of numbers or symbols that lack any
pattern.
RSA Short for RSA Data Security, Inc.; or referring to the principals - Ron
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman; or referring to the algorithm
they invented. The RSA algorithm is used in public key cryptography
and is based on the fact that it is easy to multiply two large prime
numbers together, but hard to factor them out of the product.
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol. A standardized packet format for de-
livering audio and video over the Internet.
SDK Software Development Kit. Typically a set of software development
tools that allows for the creation of applications for a certain software
software or hardware platform.
SHA-2 Secure Hash Algorithm. A set of cryptographic hash functions (SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) designed by the U.S. National
Security Agency (NSA) to replace its predecessor SHA-1.
SIP Session Initiation Protocol, an IP network protocol typically used for
VoIP telephony.
SQL Structured Query Language. A special-purpose programming lan-
guage designed for managing data in relational database management
systems (RDBMS).
SRTP The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol defines a profile of RTP
intended to provide encryption, message authentication and integrity,
and replay protection to the RTP data.
STUN Session Traversal Utilities for NAT. A standardized set of methods,
including a network protocol, used in NAT traversal for applications
of real-time voice, video, messaging, and other interactive IP com-
munications
SVN Apache Subversion, a version control system.
TCP Transmission Control Protocol, one of the core protocols of the In-
ternet protocol suite.
TLS Transport Layer Security. A secure network protocol and successor
to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).
TURN Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) is a protocol that allows
for an element behind a network address translator (NAT) or firewall
to receive incoming data over TCP or UDP connections.
UAC User Agent Client, part of the Session Initiation Protocol user agent
that is behaving like a client-server client (as opposed to UAS, User
Agent Server).
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UAS User Agent Server, the part of a Session Initiation Protocol user agent
that is behaving like a client-server server (as opposed to UAC, User
Agent Client).
UDP User Datagram Protocol, a network communications method.
VoIP Voice over IP. Commonly refers to the communication protocols,
technologies, methodologies, and transmission techniques involved in
the delivery of voice communications and multimedia sessions over
Internet Protocol (IP) networks, such as the Internet.
XML Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) is a mark-up language that
defines a set of rules for encoding documents in a format that is both
human-readable and machine-readable.
XMPP Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol. An open-standard
communications protocol for message-oriented middleware based on
XML.
ZRTP ZRTP is a cryptographic key-agreement protocol to negotiate the
keys for encryption between two end points in a VoIP telephony






Event type Argument (class) Event response type Action description
SYSTEM EXIT Application shut-down. No more events are processed.
SYSTEM PERSIST DATA Save the database (but do not close).
SECURITY USER FIRST SETUP UserDBBuilder Initialize the database for the first time
SECURITY USER AUTH UserAuthData SECURITY USER AUTH OK Authenticate a user and open database.
SECURITY USER AUTH FAILED Respond with OK if correct password, FAILED otherwise.
SECURITY USER LOGOUT Logout the user, close database, but do not exit.
CALL OUTGOING START Contact CALL OUTGOING RINGING Initialize a call to selected contact. Response can be
CALL OUTGOING DENIED that the remote phone is ringing, the call was denied
CALL OUTGOING ESTABLISHED or accepted and call was established (with CallInfo).
CALL OUTGOING CANCEL Cancel our outgoing call attempt.
CALL END End current call or call attempt.
CALL INCOMING ACCEPT CallInfo CALL INCOMING ACCEPTED Request the user to accept an incoming call. Response
CALL INCOMING DENIED can be ACCEPTED or DENIED (with error code).
CALL INCOMING CANCELED Incoming call was cancelled by remote party before itcould have been accepted. Indicate missed call.
CALL INCOMING ESTABLISHED CallInfo Incoming call accepted by user and ACKed by remoteparty. Media transmissions should start here.
CALL ERROR [SIP response code] Indicate call failure. End any call or call attempts.
CALL HISTORY MODIFIED Indicate that call history has changed.
NET CONNECTION ESTABLISHED Indicate that the underlying network has changed.
SIP INIT or SIP RESET SIP INIT OK Initialize the SIP stack and (re-)register. IF RESET, force
SIP INIT FAILED stack unload and initialize. Respond with OK or FAILED.
SIP DEREGISTER SIP REGISTRATION OK De-register from SIP server. Respond with OK or
SIP REGISTRATION FAILED FAILED.
SIP REGISTRATION REFRESH FAILED Error, SIP registration session could not be prolonged.
CALL CURRENT RECORD START CallInfo CALL CURRENT RECORD STARTED OK, Start recording current call with given parameters.
CALL CURRENT RECORD STARTED ERROR Respond with STARTED OK or STARTED ERROR.
CALL CURRENT RECORD STOP CALL CURRENT RECORD STOPPED OK Stop recording current call.
CALL CURRENT RECORD STOPPED ERROR Respond with STOPPED OK or STOPPED ERROR.
CALL RECORDED PLAYBACK START timestamp (long) CALL RECORDED PLAYBACK FINISHED Start playback of recorded call with the given timestamp.On error send PLAYBACK FINISHED.
CALL RECORDED PLAYBACK PAUSE Pause or resume the playback of a recorded call.
CALL RECORDED PLAYBACK STOP CALL RECORDED PLAYBACK FINISHED Stop the playback of a recorded call and free resources.
Table A.1: Application event types
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String SIP proxy server address
prefs sip account String SIP account user ID
prefs sip account name String SIP account username
prefs sip account pwd String SIP account password
prefs sip stack port auto TRUE Boolean
Auto-select port of the local
SIP stack
prefs sip stack port 5060 Integer
If the former property is
false, use this port.
prefs audio micgain TRUE Boolean
Audio recording volume gain
on/off
prefs audio preferred codec speex String
Codec for media transmis-
sions
prefs crypto call alg AES String
Symmetric encryption algo-
rithm used to encrypt media
transmission
prefs crypto call alg block
mode
CBC String Algorithm block mode




String Algorithm padding mode
prefs crypto call alg key size 128 String Algorithm key size (bits)
prefs crypto call data
verification method
HMAC String
Call media data verification
method. Can be ’Digest’,
’HMAC’, or ’None’.
prefs crypto call digest alg MD4 String
If ’Digest’ selected use this
algorithm.




If ’HMAC’ selected use this
algorithm.
prefs last used username String
Last username used to login
the application (Local only)
prefs crypto prime mapping String
Prime-to-index mapping for
database login (Local only)
prefs db was imported FALSE Boolean
Set to true if DB was im-
ported, after first valid login
deleted (Local only)
Table B.1: Preference types
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C. User Manual
This chapter explains how to install the application and the most important
screens of it. Before installing the application note that additional software such
as a file manager (e.g. ES File Explorer) and a QR code scanner (Barcode Scanner
application) obtainable from the Google Play store are recommended to take full
advantage of the application’s capabilities.
To install the application its installation file (crytpdroid ui.apk) must be copied
to the phone first. The simplest way is to download it in the phone’s browser
by entering the address https://cryptdroid.net/cryptdroid_ui.apk which
should save the .apk file to the phone. Alternatively the file can be copied from
the attached CD-ROM (see Appendix D) to the phone’s external storage by
transferring it over an attached USB cable or over a network service like FTP.
Independently of the way before starting the installation the “Unknown sources“
preference must be checked in Android system preferences as shown in Figure C.1.
When installing from compiled sources as described in section 3.4 the “USB
Debugging“ option in the “Development“ section must be ticked also.
Once set the installation is done easily by opening the folder containing the
downloaded .apk file (usually SD-card/downloads) and selecting it. The installa-
tion process is self explanatory as shown on the second screen of Figure C.1.
Figure C.1: Application installation screens
After running the application for the first time it will show a series of set-up
screens (Figure C.2). Please follow the on-screen instructions carefully to properly
set up a CryptDroid account. On the (third) SIP account screen follow the link to
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Figure C.2: Application set-up screens
https://www.cryptdroid.net/register/ to open a browser window and create
a SIP account on the CryptDroid server application. A more comfortable way
if available is to open the registration form on a PC browser and perform the
operation there. The credentials entered in the registration process need to be
copied to the set-up screen. The last but one screen is designed for selecting a
password of choice which must consist of at least three colors and six clicks in
total. The selected password must be re-entered on the screen (note that the
colors are positioned randomly here). By pressing the menu button in one of the
setup screens a menu will show from where the process can be stopped at any
time or an existing CryptDroid database file may be imported.
Should the the set-up finish correctly the main screen of the application should
appear. It is divided into three tabs (Figure C.3). The first tab contains a list
of contacts, the second tab holds information about made or missed calls (call
history) and the last tab shows (editable) information about the CryptDroid
account in use. The bar at the bottom of the screen displays the SIP account in
use and a filter for filtering the contact and call history lists. The filter takes as
input a username or a tag (starting with the hash “#“ sign). The icon next to
the SIP username signalized whether the SIP account registration was successful
(green icon) or not (red icon). If the icon is red please check the device’s internet
connection and SIP account settings in the preferences screen.
To start using CryptDroid contact information (including the public PGP key
rings) must be exchanged. By pressing the menu button from the main screen
a menu will pop-up containing choices for sharing the own contact information,
adding a contact, going to the preferences screen and exiting the application.
Contact information can be exchanged through files with the .cdc suffix or QR
codes. To handle QR code displaying and scanning the Barcode Scanner appli-
cation must be installed on the phone. If it is not, CryptDroid will ask to install
it. For starters try to scan the QR code in Figure 2.6 on page 28 by selecting
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“Add contact“ from the menu and pressing the “From QR“ button. The QR
code contains the author’s CryptDroid sample contact badge.
Figure C.3: Main screen tabs with sample data
Having imported a contact badge it will show in the contacts tab of the main
screen. By clicking on it a quick action menu pops up from where a call can be
placed by selecting the “Call“ option (Figure C.4). Long clicking a contact shows
a context menu for deleting or editing the contact. While in-call it is possible to
record it by selecting the “REC“ button.
It is possible to minimize the application by pressing the device’s home button.
This does not exit the application and it is still possible to receive calls even while
the application’s screen is not shown. The CryptDroid icon in the system status
bar indicates a running application in the background. To exit it the appropriate
menu option in the main screen must be selected. Should the application be
restarted the login screen is presented (Figure C.5). After the password chosen
at set-up time is entered correctly the main application screen will be shown
again.
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Figure C.4: Contact quick options and in-call screen
Figure C.5: Log-in screen
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D. CD-ROM Contents
Appended to this thesis is a CD-ROM containing the sources of the secure
communicator prototype application (CryptDroid). Files on the media include
six directories and three files:
• cryptdroid * folders – Contain source code files of the application as de-
scribed in section 3.1.
• cryptdroid ui.apk – The final binary application distributable that can be
installed on Android devices.
• thesis.pdf – A digital copy of this thesis text in PDF format.
• README.txt – File with the text of this appendix.
Program documentation is attached in form of JavaDoc HTML pages. It can
be viewed by opening the cryptdroid doc/javadoc/index.html file.
For building the application from source please refer to section 3.4. The Ant
build.xml file is located in the cryptdroid ui directory.
Google protocol buffer message sources (.proto files, partly shown in listings)
are stored in the cryptdroid base/src-proto/ directory.
Configuration files for the OpenSIPS and rtpproxy software (see section 2.4.3)
are in cryptdroid doc/conf/.
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